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PROMOTING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND
DEMOCRACY IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE:






To bankroll the rebirth of Central and Eastern Europe, forty coun-
tries and two European Community institutions joined together on May
29, 1990, to create the European Bank for Reconstruction and Devel-
opment (the Bank or EBRD). 1 The parties envisioned the Bank as
playing a decisive role in solving three major problems that have rele-
gated Central and Eastern European countries to the status of second-
tier world players: environmental degradation on an order seen nowhere
else in the developed world; undemocratic political systems that vested
power in elite bureaucracies insulated from the demands of their citi-
zens; and centrally planned economies that could not compete with
those of the free market world.
The environmental community in Central and Eastern Europe, and
throughout the world, viewed the announcement of the new Bank with
hope and optimism, and urged the Bank's founders to make sustainable
development one of its fundamental goals, in addition to the develop-
ment of market-based economies and the promotion of democracy.
Upon the Bank's creation, the institution became the first multilateral
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1. Agreement Establishing the European Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment, May 20, 1990, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1077 (1990) [hereinafter the Articles of
Agreement] (for the complete text of the Articles of Agreement see appendix A); see
also Richard A. Melchner et al., Bankrolling the Rebirth of the East, BUSINESS WEEK,
Apr. 29, 1991, at 45 (describing role of Bank in rebuilding the region).
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development bank with an environmental mandate, providing a poten-
tial model for the eventual reform of the World Bank and other re-
gional development banks.2
The environmental mandate in the Bank's Articles of Agreement
commit it to promoting three broad goals: environmentally sound and
sustainable development; democracy; and market economies.3 Unfortu-
nately, as the rhetoric of its infancy moves into the actions of its youth,
the Bank has yet to live up to either the hopes surrounding its inception
or its own mandate. Despite its progressive goals, the Bank risks be-
coming nothing more than the progeny of pre-existing development
banks.
In an effort to formulate a cohesive environmental policy, the Bank
produced several draft environmental policies and responded to com-
ments made by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The final en-
vironmental policy, however, fails in many respects to meet the man-
date its Articles of Agreement imposes on the Bank. The policy's more
egregious defects arise in its procedures for environmental assessment,
public participation and access to information. Specifically, the envi-
ronmental assessment policies exempt certain categories of activities
from preparation of any environmental assessment and allow loan pro-
ponents to prepare their own assessments. The public participation pro-
cedures fail to provide mechanisms, such as required public hearings,
which would insure that citizens and nongovernmental organizations
play a significant role in the environmental assessment process. The
Bank's public access to information procedures fail to require that criti-
cal information be made available to the public.
This Article analyzes the development of the Bank's environmental
policies, from their genesis in the Bank's Articles of Agreement up to,
and including, the Bank's actual environmental policy statements. This
article also provides suggestions for improving these policies and for
actions that can be taken by interested citizens, NGOs, and govern-
ments to encourage these improvements. Part I of this Article discusses
the state of the environment in the Central and Eastern European
countries as a backdrop to the need for sustainable development and
2. See Articles of Agreement, supra note 1, at preamble and art. 1 (describing the
principles and purpose of the Bank).
3. Id. The Articles of Agreement commit the Bank to promoting "in the full range
of its activities environmentally sound and sustainable development[J" promoting de-
mocracy and human rights; and conditioning eligibility for investment funds on pro-
gress towards market economies and democracy in the countries of operation. See id.,
preamble (mandating democracy), art. 1 at 1084 (describing the Bank's purpose), art.
2(1)(vii), at 1084 (mandating the promotion of sound and sustainable development),
and art. 8, at 1086 (conditioning investments on democracy and market economies).
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environmental recovery in the region. Part II discusses the development
of the Bank's environmental policies and outlines the final version of
these policies. This part emphasizes the evolution of these policies over
the course of the Bank's attempts at a coherent environmental policy
and discusses the role that the Center for International Environmental
Law-U.S. (CIEL-U.S.)4 and other NGOs played in the process. Part
III of the article addresses the Bank's mandates of sustainable develop-
ment and democracy as set forth in the Articles of Agreement. Part III
also seeks to provide substantive guidance to the Bank, NGOs and
others in moving from these broad proclamations to their practical ap-
plication. Part IV establishes a framework for and discusses actions the
Bank must take to transform its environmental policies into an environ-
mental program that meaningfully implements the Bank's mandates of
sustainable development and democratic principles. Part IV of the arti-
cle also provides suggestions to aid NGOs and concerned citizens in
encouraging the Bank to meet its goals.
I. STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT IN CENTRAL AND
EASTERN EUROPE: THE NEED FOR SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT
The state of the environment in Central and Eastern Europe is the
epitaph of centrally planned economies which gave production targets
precedence over human health and ecological concerns.5 In their cur-
rent state, the region's most basic natural resources - air, water and
soil - are so severely despoiled that the transition to market economies
cannot succeed without environmental restoration and protection. A
brief overview of the region's environmental condition clearly indicates
the need for sustainable development, as many of the region's leaders
have emphasized. For example, the Czech and Slovak Federal Repub-
lic's (CSFR) revolution grew out of economic and environmental dete-
4. The Center for International Environmental Law-US is a public interest, inter-
national environmental law organization established in 1989 to promote the use of com-
parative and international environmental law to protect the global environment. CIEL-
US Press Release 1 (Oct. 31, 1991).
5. See INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP ON INSTL DESIGN, HUBERT H. HUMPHREY
INST. OF PUB. AFF., U. MINN., ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT FOR POLAND: DEC-
LARATION OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT vi (1990) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENT AND
DEVELOPMENT FOR POLAND] (including among the legacies of the former government
a devastated economy and environmental crisis); J. VAVROUSEK, CZECH. FED. CoM.
FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, THE ENVIRONMENT IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA 89-90 (1990) (at-
tributing the destruction of the environment to the control system of the Czechoslova-
kian national economy) (on file with American University Journal of international
Law & Policy).
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rioration and the possibility of substantially improving "the quality of
the living environment through a permanently sustainable develop-
ment." 6 Polish experts have concluded that sustainable development
could solve its country's ecological crisis and that Poland's challenge is
"to invent those institutions that promote a sustainable society: a soci-
ety that effectively blends economic development, environmental pro-
tection and political freedom for the present population and future
generations."7
A. AIR POLLUTION
Measured by either per dollar GNP or emissions per capita, the re-
gion pollutes the air more than any other in the world.8 Regional air
pollution consists largely of sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions.
The CSFR and Poland rank first and second in nitrogen oxide emis-
sions per unit of GNP.'
Much of the sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions result pri-
marily from the region's heavy reliance on lignite (brown coal) for en-
ergy, a coal that is low in energy yet high in pollution-causing sulfur.
Despite its inefficiencies, lignite accounts for seventy-two percent of en-
ergy consumption in former East Germany and forty-one percent in the
CSFR.10 Moreover, most of the region's coal burning plants have no
pollution control equipment." In Poland, for example, ninety-one per-
cent of major industrial facilities have no emissions control equip-
ment. 2 In the CSFR only one coal plant has a de-sulfurization unit,
and that unit is currently ineffective."3
Throughout Central and Eastern Europe, the environmental and
public health consequences of inefficient industrial practices and lack of
pollution control equipment are staggering. For example, average sul-
fur dioxide concentrations in Northern Bohemia, CSFR, are two to
three times the permissible level set by the World Health Organization,
6. VAVROUSEK, supra note 5, at 7.
7. ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT FOR POLAND, supra note 5, at vi.
8. H.F. FRENCH, GREEN REVOLUTIONS: ENVIRONMENTAL RECONSTRUCTION IN
EASTERN EUROPE AND THE SOVIET UNION 13 (1990) (Worldwatch Paper No. 99).
9. See id. at 13-15 (citing M. WALSH, THE WORLD BANK, MOTOR VEHICLE POL-
LUTION IN HUNGARY: A STRATEGY FOR PROGRESS (1990)).
10. Id. at 11 (citing figures from the UNITED NATIONS, ENERGY STATISTICS YEAR-
BOOK, 1988 (1990) that together these two countries burned almost one-third of the
world's lignite).
11. Id. at 11 (adding that the plants possessing such equipment employ inferior
controls compared to Western technology).
12. ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT FOR POLAND, supra note 5, app. at 29.
13. Interview with Tomas Jirsa, Energoprojekt, in Most, Czech and Slovak Federal
Republic (Nov. 26, 1990).
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with peak emissions up to twenty-five times the permissible level." In
the former East Germany, average annual sulfur dioxide emissions are
five times the applicable United States' standard and particulate levels
are thirteen times that of the United States."5 Hungary's air pollution
results in annual losses of $15 billion Forints ($214 million), 18 as chil-
dren in highly polluted areas of Hungary are four times more suscepti-
ble to disease than in other areas of Hungary. 17 In the area around
Copsa Mica, Romania, a black powder used in rubber manufacturing
has turned even the sheep a dingy black. 18
Cities are often hardest hit. Airborne lead levels in Budapest are
thirty times the Hungarian standards.18 In the former Soviet Union,
103 cities exceed health based standards by a factor of ten, and sixteen
cities by a factor of fifty. 20 With monitoring equipment widely unavail-
able or out-dated, the worst air pollution problems may not even be
documented.
B. WATER POLLUTION
Water contamination poses an equally serious threat to the continued
economic and social vitality of the region. The drinking water of one-
third of the rural household wells in Poland violates existing stan-
dards." One-half of the CFSR's drinking water falls below health stan-
dards 2 2 and arsenic laces the water supply in seventy-six Hungarian
towns.2 3 In Slovakia, one-half of the rivers no longer support aquatic
life; they are effectively dead.2 4 One-third of Bohemia's rivers have also
died from unsustainable development. In the former East Germany, the
14. See VAVROUSEK, supra note 5, at 13-18 (presenting graphs of pollution levels
during specified periods); see also FRENCH, supra note 8, at 13 (noting that in Prague
the WHO standard for sulfur dioxide concentration is exceeded 128 days each year).
15. FRENCH, supra note 8, at I 1 (citing Liroff, Eastern Europe: Restoring a Dam-
aged Environment, EPA JOURNAL (July-August 1990)).
16. INSTITUTE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DEVELOPMENT, STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT
IN HUNGARY AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 33 (Mikl6s Bulla ed. 1989).
17. Id.
18. FRENCH, supra note 8, at 16 (citing Bohlen, Through a Thick Veil of Soot.
Romanian City Faces Future, N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1990. at Al).
19. Id. at 14-15 (noting also that formaldehyde, ozone, and carbon monoxide fre-
quently exceed standard levels).
20. Id. at 11 (citing 1988 figures from USSR STATE COMMITTEE FOR THE PROTEC-
TION OF NATURE, REPORT ON THE STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT (1989)).
21. ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT FOR POLAND, supra note 5, app. at 29.
22. VAVROUSEK, supra note 5, at 33.
23. FRENCH, supra note 8, at 18 (citing B. HOCK & L. SOMwLYODY, Freshwater
Resources and Water Quality, in STATE OF THE HUNGARIAN ENVIRONMENT (Hinrich-
son & Enyedi eds. 1990) [hereinafter HOCK & SOMLYODY]).
24. Id. at 17 (citing J. Pehe, A Record of Catastrophe and Environmental Dam-
age, reprinted in REPORT ON EASTERN EUROPE (Radio Free Europe, Mar. 23, 1990)).
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aquatic death toll stands at one-third of the rivers and 9,000 lakes. 5 In
Romania, eighty percent of river water is not potable.2"
Much of the water pollution is the result of industry and household
sewage systems which use surface waters as waste dumps. In Hungary
alone, 1.3 billion tons of untreated sewage is dumped into rivers and
lakes.2 7 One-half of Poland's cities, including Warsaw, and thirty-five
percent of its industries fail to treat their waste waters.2 8 Over one-half
of Bratislava's industrial and household waste flows untreated into the
Danube River.29 In the end, much of this waste flows with the rivers
into the Black Sea, ninety percent of which is already lifeless.3
C. HEALTH AND ECONOMIC COSTS
The health and economic cost of the region's environmental pollution
is enormous. In actual human terms, Czechoslovaks have a life span of
five to seven years less than people in the West.3 ' In Upper Silesia,
people die three to four years earlier than in other areas of Poland; in
the most polluted part of former East Germany, life expectancies are
five years less than in other parts of the country. 2 In some areas of
Northern Bohemia, people are paid a "funeral" premium to compen-
sate them for their lower life expectancy. 33 According to one report,
each year pesticides kill 14,000 people and cause 700,000 illnesses in
the former Soviet Union.3 ' Estimates of health care costs from pollu-
tion reached eleven percent of GNP in the former Soviet Union in 1987
($330 billion); pollution is costing Poland ten to twenty percent of its
25. Id. (citing Dr. V. Beer, East German environmentalist (unpublished data
1990)).
26. Id. (citing U.K. FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, ENVIRONMENTAL
POLLUTION IN THE USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE (background brief Oct. 1989)).
27. Id. (citing HOCK & SOMLYODY, supra note 23).
28. Tye, Poland is Left Choking on its Wastes, Boston Globe, Dec. 18, 1989, at 1.
29. Stansky, Pollution: The Tale of Bratislava, EAST EUROPEAN REPORTER (1988)
(J. Budaj trans.).
30. FRENCH, supra note 8, at 19.
31. REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COMMITTEE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, MINISTRY OF
ENVIRONMENT OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC, AND THE SLOVAK COMMISSION FOR ENVI-
RONMENT, CONCEPT OF STATE ECOLOGICAL POLICY 2 (undated).
32. FRENCH, supra note 8, at 22 (citing J. Gedmin, Polluted East Germany,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Mar. 16, 1990, at 19).
33. Interview with Tomas Jirsa, supra note 13.
34. FRENCH, supra note 8, at 27 (citing USSR to Raise Domestic Agchem Produc-
tion, AGROW, Aug. 11, 1989).
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GNP each year,35 and the CFSR five to seven percent of its GNP
($192 million annually on crop damage alone).36
In order to rectify these health problems, factories that cause serious
environmental problems are being closed. In the former Soviet Union in
1989, 240 plants closed for environmental reasons,37 and in former East
Germany, 65,000 factories may be closed because they do not meet
West German standards.3 8 Such closings will aggravate massive unem-
ployment, as nearly fifty percent of those residing in the former East
Germany are already unemployed. 9 Unemployment, in turn, causes
impoverishment, diminished standards of living, and increased infant
mortality and malnutrition rates, which are incompatible with sustaina-
ble development.4 Finally, pollution from Central and Eastern Europe
causes significant damage to neighboring countries at considerable cost,
including the cost imposed by the influx of "environmental refugees."
As a short-term solution, the closing of certain factories may be nec-
essary. Such measures, however, are no substitute for a long-term strat-
egy of environmentally benign development. Simply put, the region
must implement strategies for sustainable development.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE BANK'S "SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT" POLICIES
Once the region's economic and environmental destruction became
apparent, the Bank was created to help rectify the ills left by centrally
planned economies. The Bank is to do this by promoting the three goals
35. Id. at 10 (citing Feshbach & Rubin, Why Ivan Can't Breathe. Wash. Post, Jan.
28, 1990, at C2, and A. KASSENBERG, ENVIRONMENT SITUATION IN POLAND (unpub-
lished paper 1989)).
36. VAVROUSEK, supra note 5, at 69.
37. FRENCH, supra note 8, at 36 (citing WORLD CONSERVATION MONITORING
CENTER, INT'L UNION FOR CONSERVATION AND NATURAL RESOURCES (IUCN), THE
ENVIRONMENT IN EASTERN EUROPE, 1990: A SUMMARY (draft report 1990)).
38. See id. at 37 (noting that existing plants have until the end of the decade to
conform to West German standards or shut down).
39. Fisher, Germans in East Press Economic Complaints, Wash. Post, Apr. 9,
1991, at A15.
40. See WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COM-
MON FUTURE 28-31 (1987) [hereinafter OUR COMMON FUTURE]. The World Commis-
sion noted eloquently:
[P]overty itself pollutes the environment, creating environmental stress in a dif-
ferent way. Those who are poor and hungry will often destroy their immediate
environment to survive: They will cut down forests; their livestock will overgraze
grasslands; they will overuse marginal land; and in growing numbers they will
crowd into congested cities. The cumulative effect of these changes is so far-
reaching as to make poverty itself a major global scourge.
Id. at 28. See also Mathews, Redefining Security, 28 FOREIGN AFF. 162, 166 (1989)
(discussing how poverty and unemployment harm the environment).
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of a market economy, democracy and sustainable development. Al-
though developing a market economy will be important for the region's
environmental protection, the latter two goals - democracy and sus-
tainable development - form the cornerstone of what ultimately
should be the environmental policies of the Bank.
This section of the article analyzes the on-going development of the
Bank's environmental policies, including the role NGOs have played in
their creation. The analysis begins with the Bank's Articles of Agree-
ment and describes the final environmental policy and its preceding
draft environmental policies.
A. THE AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN BANK FOR
RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT
The Articles of Agreement incorporate the two tenets of sustainable
development and democratic principles of governance. They commit
the EBRD to promoting environmentally sound and sustainable devel-
opment in the full range of its activities,4' the first time that a multilat-
eral development bank has formally recognized the need for sustainable
development in its articles of agreement. The second mandate which
the Articles of Agreement impose on the EBRD is a commitment to
democratic principles. The Agreement specifically requires the EBRD
to promote democracy,42 observe democratic principles in its internal
governance, 3 and to condition eligibility for investment funds on pro-
gress toward market economies and democracy in the countries of
operation.44
This dual commitment to sustainable development and democratic
principles presents the EBRD with the unique opportunity, and respon-
41. Articles of Agreement, supra note 1, art. 2(l)(vii), at 1084. See also Draft
Chairman's Report on Articles of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment, at 2 (Apr. 9. 1990) [hereinafter Chairman's Report] (providing explanatory
notes that summarize the general understandings that led to the formulation of the
Articles) (on file with American University Journal of International Law & Policy).
The Chairman's Report notes:
Delegates recognized the serious environmental problems in Central and Eastern
Europe, and emphasized that principles of environmentally sound development
must be integrated into the full range of the Bank's operations. Thus Delegates
intended "in the full range of its activities" to include all of the Bank's activities,
including technical assistance and all special operations, and not merely that the
Bank should be able to provide support directly for specific environmental
projects.
Id. at art. 2, para. 2(iii).
42. Articles of Agreement, supra note 1, preamble, at 1083.
43. Id., art. 11, at 1087.
44. Id., arts. I and 8, at 1084 and 1086.
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sibility, to change the manner in which development occurs in Central
and Eastern Europe. If it fulfills these mandates, the EBRD will serve
as a model for other multinational institutions throughout the world in
their adoption of sustainable development principles.
Although the Articles of Agreement set the boundaries for the
EBRD's environmental policies, the policies themselves will guide the
Bank in meeting its goals. After more than one year of internal Bank
discussions and ongoing dialogue with environmental NGOs, the Bank
finally has adopted its final environmental policy. A detailed review of
this dialogue shows how NGOs were able to influence the policy, and
the future role NGOs must play in ensuring that the Bank fulfills its
sustainable development mandate.
B. THE EBRD DRAFT POLICY'S APPROACH TO ENVIRONMENTAL
MANAGEMENT
On February 13, 1992, the EBRD's Board of Directors adopted its
Environmental Procedures,45 including Environment Management: The
Bank's Policy Approach 6 (the "Environmental Policy") which con-
tains the guidelines by which the EBRD and project proponents will
evaluate loans for environmental impacts. The Bank adopted the Proce-
dures and Environmental Policy after more than a year of dialogue
with NGOs, including visits by EBRD President Jacques Attali and top
Environmental Department staff to NGO meetings in Central and
Eastern Europe.47 Despite this dialogue, as well as the Bank's commit-
ment to "plac[ing] environmental issues at the forefront of its efforts to
promote sustainable economic growth at the national and regional
level,"48 the policies fall far short of the requirements necessary to
achieve sustainable development and a culture that promotes demo-
cratic principles.
As a statement of general policy, the Environmental Policy offers
useful guidance on how the Bank should invest its funds in order to
assist the transition toward market economies in an environmentally
45. EBRD, ENVIRONMENTAL PROCEDURES (Feb. 13, 1992) (on file with American
University Journal of International Law & Policy).
46. EBRD, ENVIRONMENT MANAGEMENT: THE BANK'S POuCY APPROACH (Feb.
13, 1992) [hereinafter the FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL POUcY] (on file with American
University Journal of International Law & Policy).
47. Friends of the Earth has organized several meetings of NGOs from Central
and Eastern Europe as well as from the "West" at various sites in Central and Eastern
Europe. Each meeting has been attended by a member of the EBRD.
48. FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, supra note 46, at para. 1.
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sound and sustainable manner. To guide its investment, the Bank iden-
tified six "policy priorities":
(1) to assist the countries of operations in establishing environmental policies,
laws, rules, regulations, and developing the institutional and human resources
capacity to monitor and enforce them;
(2) to promote market-based incentives to address the underlying causes of
environmental degradation;
(3) to encourage the development of environmental goods and service indus-
tries in the countries of operations;
(4) to initiate, and support, special studies and programs to address regional
environmental problems;
(5) to adopt adequate environmental assessment and monitoring procedures to
be applied to the Bank's activities; and
(6) to promote adoption and implementation of access to information and
public participation provisions.4"
As a practical tool, however, the Environmental Procedures and En-
vironmental Policy are insufficient to implement these priorities in a
manner which actually promotes environmentally sound and sustaina-
ble development as well as principles of democracy. In particular, the
failure of the EBRD to incorporate meaningful public participation
tools has been disappointing to NGOs, including CIEL-US, Friends of
the Earth5" and Greenpeace, 51 who identified inadequacies in earlier
drafts of the Environmental Policy and presented the EBRD with alter-
natives that would achieve its mandates.
Yet, NGOs were able to influence the Bank's Environmental Policy,
and the Bank demonstrated some willingness to respond and accept the
criticism of NGOs, although not to the satisfaction of NGOs. For ex-
ample, when the Bank issued its First Draft Environmental Policy,
NGOs were particularly concerned that public participation procedures
were virtually nonexistent, and certainly not mandatory. CIEL-US,
49. Id. at para. 3. The January 6, 1991 and March 13, 1991 drafts contained only
four priorities, the second and sixth priorities emerging only in the December 19, 1991
draft. See EBRD, ENVIRONMENT MANAGEMENT: THE BANK'S POLICY APPROACH,
para. 2 (Jan. 6, 1991) [hereinafter FIRST DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY] (on file
with American University Journal of International Law & Policy); EBRD, ENVIRON-
MENT MANAGEMENT: THE BANK'S POLICY APPROACH, para. 3 (March 13, 1991)
[hereinafter SECOND DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY] (on file with American Univer-
sity Journal of International Law & Policy); EBRD, ENVIRONMENT MANAGEMENT:
THE BANK'S POLICY APPROACH, para. 3 (December 19, 1991) [hereinafter THIRD
DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY] (on file with American University Journal of Inter-
national Law & Policy).
50. Friends of the Earth is an independent global advocacy group dedicated to pre-
serving biological, cultural and ethnic diversity and has offices in 40 countries. NA-
TIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION, CONSERVATION DIRECTORY 1992, at 77 (1992).
51. Greenpeace is a worldwide nonprofit organization dedicated to preserving the
earth and the life it supports. Id. at 81.
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however, beginning with the principle that meaningful public participa-
tion is the sine qua non for ensuring sustainable development and in-
stilling principles of democracy, argued that citizens and NGOs must
have adequate access to information and a meaningful process for sub-
mitting written comments during the environmental assessment (EA)
process.52
Slowly, and only after additional commenting by NGOs,13 including
Central and Eastern Europeans, 5' public participation provisions were
strengthened.55 Whereas the First Draft Environmental Policy did not
52. Specifically, CIEL-US argued that the EBRD and its loan recipients must:
(1) begin with the premise that all information, regardless of the project type,
must be accessible;
(2) disseminate such information in all cases, except where such dissemination
would jeopardize national security or, in certain extreme cases, commercial or
industrial secrecy;
(3) notify citizens, involved governments, and NGOs of any lending activity as
soon as the EBRD undertakes a proposal for such activity;
(4) invite comments from citizens, governments and NGOs as to significant is-
sues concerning a proposed action and alternatives to such proposed action;
(5) provide a two month period, prior to the completion of the EA, for submis-
sion of written comments;
(6) provide for a public hearing, prior to the completion of the EA, at which
interested citizens, governments and NGOs are given an opportunity to present
oral testimony on the proposed action;
(7) incorporate comments received from citizens, governments and NGOs in the
final EA, and provide meaningful responses to these comments.
See Letter from Durwood Zaelke, President of CIEL-US, to Jacques Attali, President
of EBRD, and accompanying "Recommendations to Improve the EBRD's Environmen-
tal Policy and Ensure an Effective Environmental Assessment Process" 2-6 (Jan. 25,
1991) [hereinafter Zaelke Recommendations] (on file with American University Jour-
nal of International Law & Policy).
53. See, e.g., Letter from Chris Wold, CIEL-US, to Sara Paulson and Nelson
Coar, United States Department of Treasury (March 20, 1991) (on file with American
University Journal of International Law & Policy); Letter from Andrew Lees, Friends
of the Earth-U.K. to Jacques Attali, President of EBRD (Apr. 11, 1991) (on file with
American University Journal of International Law & Policy).
54. See CIEL-US WORKSHOP ON ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND CITIZEN'S
PARTICIPATION IN THE EBRD's LENDING PRACTICES (Budapest Hungary, March 26-
27, 1991) (statement of 30 environmental professionals and attorneys from Central and
Eastern Europe) [hereinafter WORKSHOP STATEMENT] (on file with American Univer-
sity Journal of International Law & Policy); Letter from Mikulas Huba, President,
Slovak Union of Landscape and Nature Protectors, to Jacques Attali of EBRD (un-
dated) (summary on file with American University Journal of International Law &
Policy).
55. The Bank even issued a set of responses to the NGO community's comments on
the EBRD's Second Draft Environmental Policy. EBRD, Responses to Comments
(May 14, 1991) [hereinafter Response to Comments] (on file with American University
Journal of International Law & Policy). The Response to Comments clarify, interpret
and, in certain instances, revise the text of the Bank's Second Draft Environmental
Policy.
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even consider citizens to be a target audience for the EA,56 citizens now
are entitled to have access to EAs1 7 and their comments must be
"taken into account" by the Bank in making a decision on whether to
fund a project."
Still, the Environmental Procedures and Environmental Policy fail to
provide adequate assurances that the EBRD can, in fact, live up to the
two principle goals of sustainable development and democratic princi-
ples, largely because of the inadequacies that remain in the public par-
ticipation and EA process. Most notably, the EBRD relies upon the
project sponsor to prepare the EA, 9 therein clouding the entire EA
mechanism with bias. Moreover, the Bank considers environmental in-
formation to be the property of the project sponsor, information to
which citizens are not entitled as a matter of course for any EBRD-
funded project, including those which potentially may have significant
environmental impacts.6 0
In addition, citizens have no voice in the screening process employed
by the Bank to determine whether, or to what extent, a project needs
an EA. NGOs had argued that the Bank should require an EA for all
projects, and that alternatively, citizens should be involved in the
screening of all projects - the process by which the EBRD would deter-
mine whether an EA should be prepared. 1 The Bank ultimately
adopted a policy which precludes public participation - and even notifi-
cation of a proposed project - in the screening process. In addition, the
Bank requires a full EA only for those projects classified as "Category
A" - those projects which potentially may have significant environmen-
56. Compare FIRST DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, supra note 49, Appendix 2,
at II (stating that "[t]he target audiences of the EA are the project designers and
sponsors, the implementing agencies and enterprises, and the Bank's staff"), with SEC-
OND DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, supra note 49, Appendix 2, at 11 (stating that
"[t]he target audiences of the EA are the project designers and sponsors, the affected
community, the implementing agencies and enterprises, and the Bank's staff").
57. FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, supra note 46, at para. 25.
58. Id. at para. 23.
59. Id. at para. 14.
60. The essential public participation section provides only that "[t]he Bank will
ensure that project sponsors provide adequate information to governments at all levels
and to the general public, especially potentially affected parties, and that the comments
and opinions expressed by these parties will be taken into account in the project ap-
proval procedures of the Bank." Id. at para. 23. This language is very similar to the
World Bank provisions which have failed to yield meaningful citizen participation or
adequate citizen access to information. See WORLD BANK, OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE
4.01: ENVIRONMENTAL AssESMENT, para. 19 (Oct. 1991) (observing that "[t]he Bank
expects the borrower to take the views of affected groups and local NGOs fully into
account in project design and implementation, and in particular in the preparation of
EAs") (on file with American University Journal of International Law & Policy).
61. See Zaelke Recommendations, supra note 52, at 2-3.
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tal impacts. The lack of participation in the screening process already
has caused concern because the Bank has not included any projects in
Category A, including an ECU 61.4 million ($75.5 million) loan to
General Motors to build an engine manufacturing and car assembly
facility.
62
The lack of participation in the screening process is an important
drawback for citizens, because the categorization of a project defines
the level of public participation in later phases of the project cycle. For
Category A projects, the project sponsor must notify citizens immedi-
ately after the project has been categorized so that citizens can partici-
pate in the scoping process.63 Although citizens can raise issues that
should be addressed in the EA during the scoping process," they must
do so without the benefit of any environmental information submitted
by the project sponsor to the Bank and without knowledge of the rea-
sons for categorizing the project.65 Public participation thus is largely
ineffective because citizens do not have access to the information neces-
sary to make informed comments. For Category B and C projects,6 no
scoping is required and citizens are not entitled to any information or
notification. The only information to which citizens are entitled is the
completed EA, a requirement that emerged only in the final Environ-
mental Policy and after constant prodding from NGOs as well as the
United States Environmental Protection Agency.67 Inconsistent with its
62. The EBRD had invested ECU 603.78 million (S743 million) through February
1992. The bulk of this financing, ECU 379.20 million (62.8 %), has gone into telecom-
munications. EBRD Fact Sheet (undated) (on file with American University Journal
of International Law & Policy).
63. ENVIRONMENTAL PROCEDURES, supra note 45, at Annex 4. The "scoping pro-
cess" refers to the process of defining the issues which will be given priority in the EA.
Early drafts of the Environmental Policy did not require scoping. After NGO com-
ments, however, the Bank incorporated a scoping process as well as citizen involvement
in the process. Zaelke Recommendations, supra note 52, at 1-3.
64. ENVIRONMENTAL PROCEDURES, supra note 45, at Annex 4.
65. FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, supra note 46, at para. 14 (providing that
"the project sponsors will prepare and submit to the [Bank's] Project Leader environ-
mental information deemed necessary during screening and Initial Review. This infor-
mation will be the property of the project sponsor").
66. Category B projects are defined as those whose significant potential impacts can
be readily identified and for which remedial measures can be prescribed without much
difficulty. Id. at Appendix 1, pp. 11-12. For these projects, a partial EA is required. Id.
Category C projects are those with insignificant potential impacts and do not require
EAs. Id.
67. See, e.g. Memorandum from Christopher Herman, United States EPA, to Pris-
cilla Coburn, Department of Treasury, para. 5 (Jan. 8, 1992) (on file with American
University Journal of International Law & Policy); Letter from Chris Wold, CIEL-
US, to Priscilla Coburn, Department of Treasury 2 (Jan. 19, 1992) (on file with Amer-
ican University Journal of International Law & Policy). The First Draft Environmen-
tal Policy originally stated that the Bank would "encourage" loan proponents to make
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policy regarding EAs, the Bank will not provide access to environmen-
tal audits. 8
The Bank has taken other steps that partially respond to concerns of
NGOs. For example, NGOs thought the information gathered in the
environmental assessment process should be obtained by an indepen-
dent third-party or by an internal entity within the Bank itself and not
by the project sponsor as the Environmental Policy provides.6 9 To alle-
viate these concerns regarding objectivity, the Bank will establish an
independent panel of experts to review a project or assist in its imple-
mentation where the potential environmental impacts are particularly
complex."°
Also, in response to NGO concerns,71 the Bank has created an envi-
ronmental veto which allows the Bank to reject a project that will cause
major environmental problems, or when a project sponsor unsatisfacto-
rily addresses environmental issues.72 While these standards are ambig-
uous, they do represent a mechanism by which the Bank can reject a
project on environmental grounds, a power it did not grant to itself in
earlier drafts. In addition, the Environmental Policy states that the
Bank will monitor the compliance of ongoing projects with their EAs
EAs publicly available. WORKSHOP STATEMENT, supra note 54, at paras. 7-16. The
Bank responded to NGO criticism that this provision fell far short of granting citizens
the right to information by stating that "[t]he text has been revised to use the stronger
term 'expect' rather than 'encourage.'" Response to Comments, supra note 55, at 6.
However, the change was not reflected in any subsequent drafts, the original language
being retained. See, e.g., THIRD DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, supra note 49, at
para. 25.
68. The project sponsor is responsible for preparing the environmental audits to
determine whether past use of a facility has resulted in significant environmental im-
pacts. ENVIRONMENTAL PROCEDURES, supra note 45, at Annex 4. In these circum-
stances, the Bank will consider citizens comments only to the extent that citizens have
registered complaints regarding the property prior to the performance of the audit. Id.
The audit is "strictly the property of the Project Sponsor" and "will not be made pub-
lic by the Bank." Id.
69. See Zaelke Recommendations, supra note 52, at 2 (suggesting that "[t]o create
an objective EA process, the EA should be prepared internally by the Bank or by an
independent contractor selected solely by the Bank").
70. FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, supra note 46, at para. 14. The provision first
appeared as a response to NGO criticism in the Bank's Responses to Comments. Re-
sponse to Comments, supra note 55, at 6; THIRD DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY,
supra note 49, at para. 15.
71. See Zaelke Recommendations, supra note 52, at 5 (suggesting that "[t]here
should be a threshold ceiling set for significant environmental impact, above which the
Board [of Directors] is not entitled to approve a project, in the same way that it would
reject a project that was not economically viable").
72. FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, supra note 46, at para. 16.
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and the Bank will investigate concerns about specific projects brought
to the Bank's attention by governments and NGOs.7
These improvements, however, do not remedy the deficiencies in the
public participation and EA provisions of the Environmental Policy. In
addition to the failings in the EA process and public participation pro-
visions discussed above, the final Environmental Policy fails to: 1)
adopt a unified overall policy which incorporates a definition of sustain-
able development consistent with contemporary international jurispru-
dence and with the EBRD's sustainable development mandate; 2) re-
quire release to the public of all environmental information gathered
prior to commencement of a project and that the public be given the
opportunity to comment on this information and to have their com-
ments addressed prior to the commencement of the project; 3) establish
either an independent quasi-judicial tribunal or grant jurisdiction to an
existing judicial body to review the actions of the Bank to ensure that
these actions comply with both the Bank's internal procedures and its
Articles of Agreement; 4) commit in writing, despite a pre-existing oral
commitment by the EBRD's President, to establish a special fund for
environmental education and training in Central and Eastern Europe;
and 5) require that a set of minimum environmental standards, such as
those of the European Community, be met in all its activities.
The continued failure of the EBRD to recognize the need for these
policy improvements calls into serious question the ability of the EBRD
to meet its twin goals of promoting democratic principles, and sound
and sustainable development. Whether or not the EBRD will become
the world's first "sustainable development bank" is now dependent on
how the EBRD, its stockholders, and its loan proponents, interpret and
apply the requirements of the Articles of Agreement and the Bank's
policy directives, as well as the ability of affected citizens, legal practi-
tioners and NGOs to keep the Bank and its stockholders focussed on
the twin goals of democracy and sustainable development.
73. The Bank will evaluate the environmental impact of a project at project com-
pletion and will continue environmental monitoring on a regular basis thereafter. Id. at
paras. 19-20. In addition, it has the authority to sanction project sponsors, including
freezing disbursements, where the Bank finds that the project sponsor is not in compli-
ance with agreed environmental standards and performance. Id. at para. 18. See also
Response to Comments, supra note 55, at 7 (stating that "[tihe Bank will monitor
compliance with environmental provisions of loans as part of the normal project super-
vision process. If concerns on a specific project are raised either by governmental or
nongovernmental organizations they will be investigated by Bank environmental
staff").
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Ill. DEFINING AND APPLYING SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT WITHIN THE ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT
A. DEFINING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
The Bank's Articles of Agreement require it to promote environmen-
tally sound and sustainable development throughout the full range of
its activities.7 4 In Our Common Future, the Brundtland Commission
popularized the term sustainable development, defining it as develop-
ment that "meets the needs of the present without compromising the
ability of future generations to meet their own needs."'75 Under the Ar-
ticles of Agreement, the Bank must meet this standard in selecting de-
velopment investments throughout Central and Eastern Europe.
Because sustainable development recognizes that the economy and
the environment are interrelated, economists and environmentalists
alike are rethinking their approach to development and environmental
protection. Economic growth is the measure traditionally used to judge
the health of an economy.76 Economic growth, however, is too narrow a
concept, because it reflects only rising consumption.7 7 Sustainable de-
velopment is a broader concept and one that includes considerations of
quality of life - the health of the population, educational standards,
the degree of poverty, and general social well-being.78 It considers the
individual as a "person-in-community" rather than as dictated only by
private-personal preferences that optimize self-interests.79 Historically,
such characteristics fell outside the bounds of economic calculations be-
cause they required non-market value judgments. Today it is clear that
the development potential of a country, including its opportunities and
limits, is significantly determined by environmental quality.80
Environmentalists are also rethinking the role a strong economy
plays in protecting the environment. They increasingly appreciate the
74. Articles of Agreement, supra note 1, art. 2(1)(vii) at 1084; Chairman's Report,
supra note 41, at 3.
75. OUR COMMON FUTURE, supra note 40, at 8.
76. Id. at 18.
77. J. PEZZEY, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF SUSTAINABLE GROWTH AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT vi (1989) (World Bank Environment Department Working Paper No.
15).
78. D. PEARCE, A. MARKANDYA, & E. BARBIER, BLUEPRINT FOR A GREEN ECON-
OMY 1 (1989) [hereinafter GREEN ECONOMY].
79. H. DALY & J. COBB JR., FOR THE COMMON GOOD: REDIRECTING THE ECON-
OMY TOWARD COMMUNITY, THE ENVIRONMENT, AND A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE 7-8
(1989).
80. ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT FOR POLAND, supra note 5, App. para. I.
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potential for sustainable development to help alleviate environmental
degradation."'
Defining sustainable development in practical terms has proven more
difficult than finding support for the concept. Fundamentally, it recog-
nizes that the scale of human development has grown far too large and
that continued growth "is overwhelmingly likely to increase costs more
rapidly than it increases benefits, thus ushering in an era of 'uneco-
nomic growth' that impoverishes rather than enriches.18 2 While defini-
tions of sustainable development abound, three principles have emerged
which most aptly describe it: the value of the environment, the need to
consider effects long into the future, and the need for both intra- and
inter-generational equity. 3 The manner in which accounting mecha-
nisms and project appraisal methods incorporate these three values also
plays an integral role in shaping a working definition of sustainable
development.
1. Value of the Environment
Recognizing that the economy and the environment in which we live
are wholly interrelated is of fundamental importance; they cannot be
considered apart from one another. "There is an interdependence both
because the way we manage the economy impacts the environment,
and because environmental quality impacts on the performance of the
economy." 4 One has only to look at Central and Eastern Europe to see
the devastating consequences - environmental, economic, social - of
neglecting the environment. Quality of life indicators derived from nat-
ural, man-made and cultural environments therefore deserve greater
emphasis than they are given in traditional economic approaches.85
To understand the connections between development and the envi-
ronment, it is useful to discuss environmental quality criteria in eco-
nomic terms. Although placing monetary values on the environment is
81. See Mathews, The New Dogma of Environmentalism, Wash. Post, Jan. 3,
1991, at A21 (stating that sustainable development "leaves behind sterile growth/no
growth debates" and acknowledges that some types of development and technology can
improve the quality of life).
82. DALY & COBB, supra note 79, at 2. Daly and Cobb describe this reality as "the
fundamental wild fact that so far has not found expression in words sufficiently fenal to
assault successfully the civil stupor of economic discourse." Id.
83. GREEN ECONOMY, supra note 78, at 2; see also E.B. WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO
FUTURE GENERATIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMON PATRIMONY AND IN-
TERGENERATIONAL EQUITY (1990) (describing the problems of intergenerational
equity).
84. GREEN ECONOMY, supra note 78, at 4.
85. Id. at 1.
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not a perfect approach, and may offend some, it is a good way to
demonstrate that environmental services are not free.8 6 By placing eco-
nomic values on environmental services, the full social cost of develop-
ment can be considered along with traditional market costs; in other
words, these costs can be "internalized" into the market. As noted pre-
viously, pollution is costing Central and Eastern European countries
hundreds of millions of dollars, and, in the case of the former Soviet
Union, over $300 billion annually. 7 In contrast, estimates suggest that
even a decade ago the United States was able to avoid $26.5 billion in
pollution damage (sixty-four percent of which was attributed to human
health benefits) through implementation of environmental legislation. 8
Finally, placing dollar values on environmental criteria also demon-
strates that people generally assign environmental criteria positive net
worth; people value clean air and water, human health, wilderness ar-
eas, and other environmental services. Reflecting these values in eco-
nomic terms can, in some cases, lead to greater environmental
protection.
Traditional investment feasibility studies fail to take into account en-
vironmental values. Yet, once a monetary value is attached to a given
environmental service or environmental quality, such as human health
or wilderness areas, the full cost of development can be better approxi-
mated when determining whether to proceed with a project. Simply
stated, development should not proceed if the benefits of development
are less than the costs of development plus the benefits of preserving
the environment."
Although various methods now exist for measuring benefits of envi-
ronmental quality,90 caution should still be used in assigning precise
numerical values to the environment. Arbitrarily assigned numbers
masquerading as precise values can appear more sophisticated and reli-
86. Id. at 80-81.
87. See supra notes 31-40 and accompanying text.
88. GREEN ECONOMY, supra note 78, at 59 (citing M. FREEMAN, AIR AND WATER
POLLUTION CONTROL: A BENEFIT-COST ASSESSMENT (1982)).
89. Id. at 63.
90. See id. at 64-74 (providing a discussion of the different methods used to mea-
sure benefits of environmental quality). The contingency value method measures a per-
son's willingness to pay for a benefit. Surveys are used to derive the average price
citizens are willing to pay for an environmental value, such as protecting whales. Id. at
69-71. The hedonistic price method measures the effect of pollution on property values.
It determines, for example, the difference in property values before and after an indus-
trial facility emitting sulfur dioxide (SO2) is constructed. Id. at 64-69. A third method,
called a travel-cost model, measures the opportunity cost in time and money the aver-
age individual will bear to use an environmental amenity. For example, it evaluates




able than they truly are. Such numbers can be used to beguile the un-
informed into believing a project is of value, when in fact it produces
no net environmental benefit. For example, it may be difficult to assign
a meaningful value to an event such as a nuclear meltdown, which has
a low probability of occurrence but catastrophic consequences. Global
threats to life-sustaining systems such as the atmosphere are equally
difficult to quantify in economic terms.
Numerical values and improved accounting methods may enable us
to internalize environmental concerns into decisions implicating the
"development" side of "sustainable development." In order to realize
the "sustainable" side of the equation, however, we must also consider
principles of futurity and equity.
2. Futurity
The very notion of sustainability implies extending forecasts far into
the future and providing more wealth, not less, to future generations."'
The short-sightedness which traditionally has dominated economic
thinking must be overcome. Sustainable development evaluates advan-
tages and disadvantages of a project in the short term, measured in
periods of years, as well as the long term, measured by the passing of
generations."'
3. Equity
Sustainable development is concerned with balancing two goals: di-
minishing and eliminating poverty for present generations (intragenera-
tional equity) and leaving future generations with at least an equivalent
quality of life (intergenerational equity). It requires that present gener-
ations provide future generations with the same amount of "wealth" as
they inherited.
There are, however, two different types of wealth: capital wealth and
natural wealth. Capital wealth includes all wealth created or produced
by man's efforts, such as industrial complexes and the fruits of human
intelligence. Natural wealth includes all environmental assets such as
91. Id. at 3.
92. ARDEN & WALL, WISDOMKEEPERS: MEETINGS WITH NATIVE AMERICAN SPIR-
ITUAL ELDERS 68 (1990) (citing Oren Lyons, Faithkceper of the Turtle Clan of the
Onondaga Nation and spokesman for the Six Nations Iroquois Confederacy) (on file
with American University Journal of International Law & Polico). Oren Lyons stated,
"In our way of life, in our government, with every decision we make, we always keep in
mind the Seventh Generation to come. It's our job to see that the people coming ahead,
the generations still unborn, have a world no worse than ours - and hopefully better."
Id.
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air, water, soil, flora and fauna. This distinction is of the utmost impor-
tance to an understanding of sustainable development.
Principles of intergenerational equity require present generations to
provide future generations with at least as much natural wealth as the
present generation enjoyed at its inception. Capital wealth is no com-
pensation for natural wealth, as natural wealth supports life. 3 Capital
wealth consumes natural wealth, and thus depletes the earth's ability to
sustain life.94 Further, natural wealth suffers irreversibilities - numer-
ous natural resources cannot be replaced or restored. A lost species, for
example, cannot be recovered. In contrast, manmade wealth is gener-
ally replaceable or reparable. The owner of a damaged automobile can
choose to buy a new car or can repair the harm done to the old car.
9 5
Similarly, natural wealth often cannot be increased (nonrenewable re-
sources), whereas manmade wealth can be increased and decreased.96
Finally, preservation of natural wealth for millions of people means
preserving their sustainable livelihoods. Where people are living in har-
mony with nature, principles of both intra- and inter-generational eq-
uity require the protection of their natural resource base and their way
of life.
97
A growing body of international law reflects these principles of eq-
uity, and suggests that present generations have a legal obligation to
preserve natural wealth for future generations. The Preamble to the
1972 United Nations Declaration on the Human Environment 8 states:
"To defend and improve the human environment for present and future
generations has become an imperative goal for mankind." The text of
the UN Declaration makes clear that the Preamble seeks to "defend
93. PEZZEY, supra note 77, at 42.
94. Id. at 42-43.
95. As with any generality, there are exceptions to this paradigm. In this case,
these exceptions include edifices of architectural heritage and ancient monuments. Over
the course of time both architectural heritage and ancient monuments take on intrinsic
values which are irreplaceable, making them more like natural than manmade wealth.
GREEN ECONOMY, supra note 78, at 36.
96. PEZZEY, supra note 77, at 20 (citing D. PEARCE, E. BARBIER & A. MAR-
KANDYA, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND THE COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS, CANADIAN
ENVIRONMENTAL ACCESSMENT RESEARCH COUNCIL WORKSHOP ON INTEGRATING Ec-
ONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENTS (Vancouver, Canada, Nov. 17-18, 1988)).
97. In this regard, the EBRD should fund projects which promote subsistence
farming and alternative small-scale agriculture. Many of the problems associated with
farming in the United States are a result of machinery and fertilizer intensive farming.
Farming in the United States is the most energy inefficient in the world, has lead to
massive soil erosion, and contaminated water supplies.
98. Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,
U.N. Doc. A/Conf.48/14 (Stockholm, Sweden June 5-16, 1972), reprinted in I1
I.L.M. 1416 (1972) [hereinafter UN Declaration].
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and improve the human environment" by protecting natural wealth.
Principle 2 heralds the protection of the air, land, flora, and fauna. 9 In
addition, principle 5 declares that non-renewable resources should not
be exhausted,"' ° and principle 6 protects the soil against any substance,
including heat, which is discharged in excess of the environment's as-
similative capacity to neutralize that substance.
Other international agreements ensure that specific aspects of the en-
vironment are protected for future generations. These include, for ex-
ample, agreements protecting marine waters,101 wildlife, 0 2 and particu-
lar marine species.10 3 Others provide protection for unique habitats or
regions.
International organizations have asserted the right of future genera-
tions to natural wealth. The United Nations Economic Commission for
Europe issued a draft Charter on Environmental Rights and Obliga-
tions proclaiming that present generations have a fundamental respon-
sibility "to protect and conserve the environment for the benefit of pre-
sent and future generations."' 0'" The Experts Group on Environmental
Law of the World Commission on Environment and Development pre-
pared a report assessing existing international law and proposing new
international law for environmental protection and sustainable develop-
ment.0 5 Article 2 of the report, premised largely on principles 1, 5, and
99. Principle 2 states:
The natural resources of the earth including the air, water, land, flora and fauna
and especially representative samples of natural ecosystems must be safeguarded
for the benefit of present and future generations through careful planning or
management, as appropriate.
Id.
100. Id. at Principle 5. This principle perhaps states a paradox. Non-renewable
resources may never be exhausted, because as they grow more scarce, the price in-
creases and substitutes are found. Certain renewable resources, such as fish, can and
have been exhausted by "over-fishing." See Mathews, supra note 40, at 164.
101. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, done at Montego Bay,
Jamaica, Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/122 (1982), reprinted in 21 I.L.M.
1261 (1982); Convention for the Protection of the Natural Resources and Environment
of the South Pacific region, done at Noumea, New Caledonia, Nov. 25, 1986, reprinted
in 26 I.L.M. 38 (1987); Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea
Against Pollution, done at Barcelona, Spain, Feb. 10, 1976, reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 290
(1976).
102. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species, opened for signa-
ture Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, T.I.A.S. No. 8249, 993 U.N.T.S. 243.
103. International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 161
U.N.T.S. 74.
104. UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE, DRAFT CHARTER ON
ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS, para. 2 (adopted at the Experts meeting
in Oslo, Norway, 29-31 October 1990) [hereinafter ECE Draft Charter].
105. EXPERTS GROUP ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW OF THE WORLD COMMISSION ON
ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND SUSTAINABLE
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6 of the UN Declaration, obliges countries to "conserve natural re-
sources for future generations and prevent and abate pollution and nat-
ural resource destruction."'' 10 Article 3, meanwhile, makes clear that
the duty extends beyond individual resources or species. It requires
countries to protect ecosystems, ecological processes and maximum bio-
logical diversity.1
0 7
4. Accounting Mechanisms'0 8
Managing the environment for sustainable development cannot occur
without accounting for existing stocks of resources. Decision-makers
cannot develop environmental policies that husband environmental re-
sources now and into the future, without knowing how much of a given
resource exists. Comparable and reliable data are needed, and the
EBRD must use its resources to help develop and gather this data.
Such an accounting would serve three purposes: to determine the level
of any given resource available at any given time; to determine the uses
of the natural resource, where the resource is located, and how it is
transformed over time; and to provide a mechanism so that a physical
inventory is needed only once. After the initial inventory, present re-
source stocks can be calculated from the previous year's stocks.
Although the task of accounting for the natural resources within a
given country seems daunting (and at the regional level even more diffi-
cult), two systems of accounting have been developed and implemented
in several countries. The "monetary" approach requires measurement
of national income to reflect the costs associated with depletion of natu-
ral resources and other environmental losses.' 09 The "physical" or Nor-
wegian approach counts natural resources in a separate accounting
framework; existing stocks are recorded and balanced each year against
the amount used or exported and the amount imported." 0
DEVELOPMENT (1986) [hereinafter EXPERTS] (on file with American University Jour-
nal of International Law & Policy).
106. Id. at 43. The text of Article 3 reads: "States shall ensure that the environ-
ment and natural resources are conserved and used for the benefit of present and future
generations." Id. at 42.
107. Id. at 45.
108. This section is a summary adapted from GREEN ECONOMY, supra note 78, at
93-119.
109. Id. at 104-13.




Strict application of sustainable development principles to each pro-
ject could, admittedly, make significant development infeasible."' 1 It
may not be acceptable to decrease development opportunities (which
can increase the quality of life) when people have such difficulty meet-
ing basic human needs. Development which continues the environmen-
tal degradation of past policies, however, is equally unacceptable and
economically unviable.
This tension makes certain trade-offs, which can occur in two ways,
compelling. One method mitigates the unacceptable loss of one natural
resource by creating the same or a related resource elsewhere. Where a
project maximizes short-term benefits but negatively impacts future
generations' needs, some portion of the benefits could be held in trust
for future generations. " 2
Another method defines sustainable development at the program
level rather than the project level. To meet sustainable development
requirements at the program level, total program benefits must, at a
minimum, equal total program costs.1 3 Thus, for example, if one area's
economic conditions warrant less-than-sustainable development, other
projects within the same overall program must be built that compen-
sate for the loss of sustainability.
B. DEFINING DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES
In addition to promoting sustainable development, the Bank's Arti-
cles of Agreement require it to promote multiparty democracy, to ob-
serve democratic principles in its internal governance, 1 4 and to condi-
tion investment funds on progress towards democracy in the countries
of operation. 5 First, and foremost, such democratic principles describe
a method for making political decisions under the guidance of the peo-
ple 116 - where all citizens have the opportunity to participate equally
in decisions affecting their well-being.
111. Id. at 127.
112. J. PEZZEY, supra note 77, at 58 (citing T. TIETENBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL AND
NATURAL RESOURCE ECONOMIcS 432 (1984)). For example, a United States electric
utility is planting trees in Central America to absorb an equivalent amount of carbon
dioxide (CO ) emitted from its new power station in the northeastern United States.
The United States also has a policy which allows a developer to destroy wetlands under
certain circumstances provided it creates wetlands elsewhere.
113. GREEN ECONOMY, supra note 78, at 127-30; J. PEZZEY, supra note 77, at 58-
59.
114. Articles of Agreement, supra note 1, art. II, at 1087.
115. Id., art. 1, at 1084, art. 8 at 1086.
116. R. BASSETr, ESSENTIALS TO PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY 100, 102 (1935).
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Open and free citizen participation advances the interest of both the
individual and society;' 1 7 it develops political competency and safe-
guards fundamental human rights. It has also proven to be one of the
key forces for protecting the environment in the United States and
other Western countries. Effective citizen participation, however, re-
quires access to information, the ability to influence the decision-mak-
ing process, and the opportunity for independent review of the govern-
ment's decisions. These aspects of citizen participation are
interdependent parts of democracy.
Access to information provides citizens with the ability to participate
effectively in the environmental decision-making process." 8 Citizens
should be able to ask informed questions about proposed projects and
offer informed and articulate criticism." 9 This can be done only if they
have complete and timely information about proposed projects.120 The
right to such information has been a long-standing cornerstone of
Western environmentalism, activism, and democracy.'
21
The right of citizens to challenge and reverse arbitrary exercises of
power accompanies this right to information. Citizens should be able to
check decisions of a run-away official that could otherwise undermine
the collective will of the people or the democratic process itself. Inde-
pendent judicial review is the most effective guardian against arbitrary
government decisions, as it ensures that citizen concerns are adequately
considered and addressed in the decision-making process. These proce-
dures promote self-government - the very essence of democracy.
122
Self-government, in turn, provides an environment in which sustaina-
ble development is more likely to flourish. Under self-government prin-
ciples, decisions emanate from the citizenry and are expressed through
their leaders. Decisions are made by more than just the relative few
who stand to benefit from exploitation of the Earth's resources. Instead,
power rests with all of us to decide our collective fate.
117. W.J. STANKIEWICZ, APPROACHES TO DEMOCRACY: PHILOSOPHY OF GOVERN-
MENT AT THE CLOSE OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, 170 (1980); See Jaffe, The Citizen
as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA.
L. REV. 1033, 1044 (1968) (delineating various arguments for encouraging citizen par-
ticipation); and R. BASSETT, supra note 116, at 113 (same).
118. Project, Government Information and the Rights of Citizens, 73 MICH. L.
REV. 971, 1022 (1975).
119. Duncanson, Law, Democracy and the Individual, 8 LEGAL STUD. 303 (1988).
120. ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT FOR POLAND, supra note 5, at 8, para. 39.
121. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988) (providing such rights to
United States citizens).
122. Jaffe, supra note 117, at 1045; ECE Draft Charter, supra note 104.
[VOL. 7:559
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
C. APPLYING DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES TO SECURE SUSTAINABLE
GROWTH IN THE EBRD's POLICIES
Neither of the Bank's primary goals - sound and sustainable devel-
opment and the promotion of democratic principles - exist in a vac-
uum. Each must exist in concert with the other. Although the Environ-
mental Policy does not formally embrace open citizen participation and
self-government in its efforts to achieve sustainable development, effort
must be made in future policy directives to unify these two goals or to
revise existing EBRD policy.
Where such revisions are not forthcoming, however, citizens and
NGOs must ensure that the Bank conforms its policies in its day-to-day
practice. Recognizing that existing Bank policies do not meaningfully
implement its mandates to promote sustainable development and prin-
ciples of democracy, the next section offers a framework which the
Bank should implement to do so.
IV. INTERPRETING THE EBRD'S POLICIES:
ESTABLISHING COMPLIANCE WITH THE UNIFIED GOALS
OF DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT
A. PROJECT SELECTION
The EBRD's operating principles for selecting projects to be funded
should be carefully tailored towards achieving sustainable development.
The operating principles must require consideration of the long-term
environmental effects of development and a respect for natural re-
sources, particularly those held as common resources. The principles
should be prospective and risk averse - recognizing that future gener-
ations' needs may be destroyed if development proceeds where great
scientific uncertainty remains.
At the March 1991 Workshop on Environmental Protection and Cit-
izen Participation in the EBRD's Lending Practices, held in Budapest,
attorneys and environmental professionals called on the Bank to take
its sustainable development mandate seriously and "to make sound and
well-considered ecologically-based investment decisions which prevent
harm to the environment and improve or restore the severely damaged
environments of Central and Eastern Europe."' 23 A policy adopting ap-
propriate substantive and procedural mechanisms is one method to en-
sure sustainable development and to protect future generations' natural
123. WORKSHOP STATEMENT, supra note 54, at para. 4.
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resource wealth. Each project funded by the EBRD, including interme-
diary lending operations, should meet the substantive criteria described
below. If the EBRD approves a loan which fails to meet one of these
criteria, the reasons for the exception should be fully explained and
made available to the public.
First, energy efficiency is one of the most important factors in deter-
mining whether a project is sustainable."2 4 The Bank must consider
both the type of energy used and a project's energy efficiency. 125 Al-
though use of energy-efficient technology may increase a project's ini-
tial cost, energy efficiency will frequently increase profits. 26
The Bank should finance and create incentives for projects which use
natural resources in the most environmentally-efficient manner, includ-
ing keeping wastes to a minimum.'27 As with energy efficiency, re-
source-efficient technologies and processes, waste reduction, and pollu-
tion prevention can increase profits and reduce future environmental
liabilities.
28
Second, the Bank should encourage diversification of production. Di-
versification removes a country's reliance on "exports of nonrenewable
resources, over-reliance on monocultures, or activities that make ex-
treme demands on the environmental assimilative capacity of the re-
gion.' 1 29 Diversification also improves a country's economic base.
Third, the Bank should avoid financing projects dependent on envi-
ronmentally damaging governmental policies. Certain governmental
policies, for example energy subsidies, can cause huge market distor-
tions leading to great environmental damage. The potential damage of
such projects is illustrated by Norsk Hydro's (a Norwegian company)
124. Criteria for Sustainable Development Management, U.N. Centre on Transna-
tional Corporations, 16 Sess., at 4, U.N. Doc. E/C/.10/1990/10 (1990) (as submitted
to the Commission on Transnational Corporations).
125. See generally ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT FOR POLAND, supra note 5,
at para. 95 (recommending that Poland switch to more efficient and less environmen-
tally damaging energy sources).
126. FRENCH, supra note 8, at 41-42. The Bank should strictly avoid investments
such as OPIC's (United States Overseas Private Investment Corporation) financing of
General Electric's $150 million refurbishment of thirteen incandescent lightbulb facto-
ries in Hungary. Id. Had that same amount of money been invested in compact-fluores-
cent lightbulb factories, the Hungarian government would have been able to defer the
$10 billion spent constructing new, polluting, coal-fired power plants. Id.
127. See generally ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT FOR POLAND, supra note 5,
at para. 95-96 (discussing recommendations for the reform of Polish energy policies).
128. INTERNATIONAL UNION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF NATURE AND NATURAL
RESOURCES, U.N. ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMME & WORLD WIDE FUND FOR NA-
TURE, CARING FOR THE WORLD: A STRATEGY FOR SUSTAINABILITY 77 (second draft




recent investment in Slovakia's ZSNP Ziar Nad Hronom aluminum
plant. Norsk Hydro conditioned the investment on Slovakia's promise
to continue electrical subsidies to the Ziar plant, which is the single
largest consumer of electricity in the country. Rather than continue the
electricity-intensive process of primary aluminum smelting, the Ziar
plant easily could have switched to secondary aluminum manufactur-
ing. Discounting for the subsidies, secondary manufacturing makes
more commercial sense and would significantly reduce the demand for
coal-fired electricity in Slovakia. 30 Avoiding projects dependent on
such government policies would further the Bank's goal of promoting
free markets as well as the goal of sustainable development.
Fourth, the Bank should invest in projects that develop and use
human resources.131 Sustainable development does not reject the use of
technology. It does, however, promote the use of labor-intensive
projects rather than capital-intensive projects.
B. ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT POLICIES
The EBRD should tailor its project selection procedures to choose
only environmentally sound and sustainable projects, and its environ-
mental assessment (EA) policies should ensure the identification and
incorporation of these projects. The EA process is the principal mecha-
nism for evaluating a project's environmental consequences and for im-
plementing the goals of sustainable development and democracy in the
assessment process. The EBRD's environmental assessment policies are
perhaps the area of Bank policy which most desperately needs to be
corrected by the Bank either through an amended policy or as a matter
of practice.
1. Objective Environmental Assessment Preparation
Under the EBRD's environmental assessment poli~y, the project
sponsor is responsible for preparing the environmental assessment. The
lack of objectivity in this policy is readily apparent. The purpose of the
environmental assessment is to ensure that the decision-maker obtains
all necessary and available information regarding any "reasonably fore-
130. See Mikulas Huba, Slovak Parliament Member and Chairman of its Environ-
mental Committee, speech to the Slovak Parliament, May 22, 1991; Open letter from
Juraj Mesik, Vice-President, Slovak Union of Landscape and Nature Protectors to the
Honorable Gro Brundtland, Prime Minister of Norway, June 7, 1991 (commenting on
the situation involving coal-fired electricity in Slovakia).
131. Batie, Sustainable Development: Challenges to the Profession of Agricultural
Economics, 71 AMER. J. AGRIc. EcoN. 1083, 1087 (1989).
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seeable, significant adverse effects" before making decision on the im-
plementation of a project.1"2 A project sponsor, the person with the
greatest financial and personal interest in the adoption of the project, is
incapable of objectively reviewing its own project. The project sponsor
will be reluctant to develop and release information that diminishes po-
tential for financing, and will limit the participation of concerned citi-
zens and NGOs who seek to develop such information. Sponsor-pre-
pared assessments will fall far short of objective presentations of all
necessary and available information on the project. They will, instead,
serve as mere justifications for the viability of the proposed project.
The experiences of the World Bank's environmental assessment pro-
gram exposes the failure of sponsor-prepared environmental assess-
ments to achieve either sustainable development or democratic princi-
ples. The World Bank program, like the EBRD policy, permits project
sponsors to prepare environmental assessments. The World Bank envi-
ronmental assessments have failed to identify projects which, due to
adverse environmental impacts, should be stopped. This deficiency in
the assessment process caused the World Bank to fund a significant
number of loan projects which resulted in large-scale environmental
degradation, and brought significant criticism to bear on the World
Bank. 113
132. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 (1991) (detailing the situations in which United
States federal agencies must consider an environmental impact statement as incom-
plete). The government reinforces the importance of the information acquisition period
by proscribing the applicant from acting on its project during the process. See 40
C.F.R. § 1506.1 (1991) (describing limitations on actions during the assessment pro-
cess). Environmental assessment programs, such as the one envisioned by the EBRD,
have their ultimate genesis in the concepts and requirements developed under the
United States' National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) - the first statute to re-
quire a comprehensive analysis of proposed projects prior to commencement. National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852
(1970) as amended by Pub. L. No. 94-52, §§ 2, 3, 89 Stat. 258; Pub. L. No. 94-83, 89
Stat. 424 (1975) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(a) (1988)). NEPA,
and its international progeny, have been instrumental in democratizing environmental
decision-making processes in countries which have adopted such laws. Generally, such
laws have two components: an information gathering requirement, and an information
access and comment provision.
133. For example, the World Bank continues to provide a financing package of over
$450 million to the Sadar Sadovar dam project in India. WORLDWIDE NEWS, Nov.-
Dec. 1989, at I (on file with American University Journal of International Law &
Policy). When completed this project will displace well over 80,000 people and will
wreck environmental havoc upon a once pristine river. Id. at 8. Opposition has become
so great that in 1991 the World Bank decided to commission an independent review
panel to investigate this environmental nightmare. Narmada Review Panel Due,
WORLD BANK WATCH, Feb. 25, 1991 at 7. See also FUNDING ECOLOGICAL AND SO-
CIAL DESTRUCTION: THE WORLD BANK AND INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (Bank
Information Center ed. 1990) (discussing case studies of World Bank and IMF funded
projects in eight countries that have had devastating ecological and social impacts)
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To right the course of the EBRD's environmental assessment pro-
gram, either an independent third-party, answering only to the Bank's
staff, or a division of the Bank's environmental staff, must prepare the
environmental assessment on all projects. 134 The project sponsor's in-
volvement should be limited solely to providing information and com-
mentary to the assessment preparer. Such a program of independent
review will result in more objective assessments that more fully evalu-
ate the environmental impact of all projects.
If the Bank declines to adapt its policy to require independently-pre-
pared assessments, then the Bank should, through operational direc-
tives, require its environmental staff to thoroughly review all assess-
ments prepared by loan proponents. This review should verify the
accuracy and veracity of the contents of the assessment, and ensure
that the assessment fully develops and addresses all areas of environ-
mental concern attendant to the proposed project. At the conclusion of
such a review, the Bank should adopt the assessment in writing and
assume full responsibility for its scope and content.135
To overcome the inherent structural defects of proponent-prepared
environmental assessments, NGOs and citizens should develop their
own shadow programs to monitor the information made available to
them and to develop independent information both to ensure the verac-
ity of the proponent's information and to fill the void where the propo-
nent's information is not released to the public. Essential to this shadow
structure will be a network of educated and informed persons, ranging
from lawyers to geologists, who will be able to review loan projects for
interested citizens and NGOs.
[hereinafter Bank Information Center] (on file with American University Journal of
International Law & Policy); Rich, 12 ECOL. L.Q. 675 (1985) (describing a litany of
World Bank projects that have been socially and environmentally destructive).
134. Such a requirement is analogous to the requirement in the United States
under the NEPA, which requires that a government agency, or a contractor with no
interest in a project, prepare an environmental assessment of projects undertaken by an
agency or in which the government has a certain degree of direct or indirect involve-
ment. 40 C.F.R. § 1506.5(c) (1990).
135. Essentially, the review should resemble the requirements imposed on United
States government agencies when an independent contractor prepares an environmental
assessment for an agency. 40 C.F.R. § 1505.1 (1990) (The minimum standards estab-
lished in Section 1505.1 include: (1) requiring that relevant environmental documents,
comments and responses are incorporated into the record; (2) requiring that these doc-
uments, comments and responses accompany the proposal through the agency review;
(3) requiring that the alternatives considered by the decision-maker are incorporated in
the record; and (4) requiring that the procedures followed meet the policies and pur-
poses of developing and making public environmental information concerning a pro-
posed project).
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2. Substantive and Procedural Environmental Assessment
Requirements
a. The Requirement of an Environmental Assessment
The Environmental Policy states that an environmental assessment
should be an integral part of every aspect of its activities, and that
certain lending operations require programmatic assessments. 136 Ini-
tially, the Bank proposed a screening process similar to the much criti-
cized World Bank process - a process which can be used to shield
much of the Bank's lending activity from environmental scrutiny. The
Bank subsequently clarified its policy so that all proposed projects will
be individually screened. The screening categories will merely be used
to determine the level of environmental scrutiny to be given to each
project.' 37 Individual scrutiny of projects prior to the decision to re-
quire an environmental assessment is comparable to the processes used
in Bulgaria,' 38 the EA law proposed in Czechoslovakia, 39 and the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in the United States.1
40
Whether the EBRD will in fact meaningfully screen each project to
determine whether an EA is necessary, is impossible to determine. Con-
tinued vigilance by NGOs will be required to ensure that the Bank
meets its environmental responsibilities.
b. Timing
The EA should be prepared at the earliest stage in the Bank's deci-
sion-making process. In the United States, for example, an agency is
required to prepare an environmental impact statement as early as pos-
sible in the decision-making process, generally at the time the agency is
developing or is presented with an initial proposal or application for
funding.1 4 1 "Proposal" is defined as that stage in the decision-making
136. ENVIRONMENTAL PROCEDURES, supra note 45, at Annex 5. A programmatic
EA is one which assesses not only the environmental impacts of a single project, but
also examines the project's interrelation with related or cumulative projects, and as-
sesses the impacts of the overall program which the project is part.
137. Response to Comments, supra note 55, at 5. The Bank notes that its screening
program is intended to be similar to that used by the United States for bilaterally
funded lending projects. Id. See 22 C.F.R. § 216 (1990) (setting out the United States
Agency for International Development's environmental screening procedures).
138. Environmental Protection Act, Oct. 2, 1991, ch. b (BuIg.); WORKSHOP STATE-
MENT, supra note 54 (Statement of Stephan Kyutchukov and Professor Mario
Pascalev).
139. WORKSHOP STATEMENT, supra note 54 (Statement of Jiri Plaminek, Hun-
garian Federal Committee for the Environment).
140. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (1988).
141. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.5 (1990).
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process where the agency has a goal and is actively deciding on a
means to accomplish that goal.14 2 Similarly, the United Nations Eco-
nomic Commission for Europe Transboundary EIA Convention explic-
itly provides for an EA at an early stage in the decision-making pro-
cess.14 3  These requirements ensure that agencies develop the
environmental assessment when it will be of the most value to the deci-
sion-maker. If the EA process is to be of any assistance in evaluating
development proposals, the EBRD should provide for an EA process
which begins immediately after a loan application is received.
c. Scoping Process
A scoping process should be required prior to preparing an EA for
all projects, not only Category A projects. A scoping process investi-
gates all factors relevant to a particular project and discusses the na-
ture, aims, methods, geographical boundaries and purpose of the pro-
ject. In addition, scoping should include a description of the project
site's existing environmental condition and its development potential, if
the project is not approved.1 44 Threshold requirements established at
the beginning of the process are necessary to ensure that the environ-
mental review is thorough, complete, and accurate.
d. Information Required
It is unclear whether the information requirements of the EBRD's
EA process are mandatory. The EBRD's Environmental Policy declares
that the "Bank will expect the environmental assessment to forecast the
potential environmental effects of a project .. ."I" In order to ensure
sustainable development, the information requirements should be
142. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.23 (1990).
143. Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundry Con-
text, U.N. Economic Commission for Europe, preamble, U.N. Doc. E/ECE/1250 re-
printed in 30 I.L.M. 800, 802 (1991) [hereinafter ECE Transboundary EIA
Convention].
144. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25 (1990) (describing the scoping process under
NEPA). The scoping process establishes the range of actions, alternatives and impacts
to be considered in the EA. Id. To determine the scope of the EA at least three types of
actions should be reviewed: connected actions; cumulative actions; and similar actions.
Id. at § 1508.25(a)(I),(2),(3). Scoping should also examine three types of alternatives:
a no action alternative; other reasonable courses of action; and mitigation measures. Id.
at § 1508.25(b)(1),(2),(3). Finally, scoping should review three types of impacts: di-
rect; indirect; and cumulative. Id. at § 1508.25(c),(1),(2),(3).
145. FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, supra note 46, at para. 14. In addition, the
Environmental Procedures, Annex 5, which lists the information "expected" in the EA,
begins: "The EA should include ...." ENVIRONMENTAL PROCEDURES, supra note 45
(emphasis added).
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mandatory and the Bank should make this explicit in its policy state-
ment. The provisions of the EC Council Directive1 46 and NEPA1
47
should serve as a model for the modification of the EBRD's informa-
tion requirements of the Environmental Policy Report, to ensure the
EBRD has a mechanism capable of promoting sustainable develop-
ment. The following information, included in the EA provisions of
other international institutions and countries, should be incorporated in
an EBRD EA: an in-depth discussion of direct and indirect, short and
long-term consequences; 148  cumulative effects; 149  transfrontier and
global effects; 150 and the relationships between the short- and long-term
use of resources and between short-term environmental enhancement
and long-term productivity. At a minimum, an EBRD EA should in-
clude the potential impact on the following factors: the biophysical en-
vironment, including energy resources, soil, water, air, climate, land-
scape, flora, fauna, and their habitats; architectural, historic and
cultural resources; ecological balance; the interrelationships between
each of these factors; 15' and the socio-economic environment when it is
interrelated with environmental effects.'1
2
146. Commission of European Communities, Council Directive 85/337/EEC on the
Assessment of the Effects of Certain Public and Private Projects on the Environment,
art. 3, 1985 O.J. (L175) 40, 41 [hereinafter EC Directive].
147. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370a (1988).
148. EC Directive, supra note 146; 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1988). See 40 C.F.R. §
1508.8 (1990) (defining environmental effects to include both direct and indirect, rea-
sonably foreseeable effects).
149. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (1990) (stating that all cumulative impacts include
the effects on the environment of the proposed project of "past, present, and reasonably
foreseeable future actions" regardless of whether such actions are public or private).
150. EC Directive, supra note 146, art. 3; 42 U.S.C. 4332(F) (1988); see gener-
ally, ECE Transboundary EIA Convention, supra note 143 (discussing environmental
assessments at the international level). Investigation of long-term effects, and trans-
frontier and global effects is implicit in sustainable development. See also WORKSHOP
STATEMENT, supra note 54, at para. 10(c) (requiring an EA to address transboundary
pollution prevention).
151. EC Directive, supra note 146, art. 3; 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1988); ECE Trans-
boundary EIA Convention, supra note 143, at art. l(vii).
152. See EC Directive, supra note 146, art. 4 (limiting the definition of "effects" to
natural and physical manifestations of a project). NEPA, however, extends "effects" to
include direct and indirect social and economic impacts when they are interrelated with
natural and physical environmental impacts. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.8, 1508.14 (1990). The
NEPA requirement more accurately reflects the reality of environmental disturbances
and sustainable development because environmental problems most often are insepara-
ble from social and economic considerations. See Section I.C. HEALTH AND EcONOMIC
COSTS, supra notes 31 - 40 and accompanying text (detailing the health and economic
effects of environmental issues).
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e. Alternatives and Mitigation Measures
The Bank, in failing to mandate exploration of alternatives or miti-
gation measures, omits the heart of the EA process and permits project
proponents to focus on very narrowly conceived projects. A discussion
of a broad, but reasonable, range of alternatives (including a "no-ac-
tion" alternative where appropriate) and measures to mitigate adverse
environmental impacts of the proposed project inevitably broadens the
range of options available and may lead to the discovery of alternatives
that are more sustainable and environmentally sound. Frequently these
alternatives also identify and create a more cost-effective project. Such
an analysis provides decision-makers with the information necessary to
evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of each alternative and
make informed and knowledgeable choices regarding the allocation of
resources. Similar provisions exist under NEPA and the ECE Trans-
boundary EIA Convention. 153
f. Incomplete Information
If information necessary to evaluate "reasonably foreseeable" signifi-
cant adverse impacts in an EA is incomplete or unavailable, but is
available without exorbitant cost, the EBRD should require that this
information be included in the EA. If the information entails an exorbi-
tant cost, the EA should summarize relevant and credible scientific evi-
dence which does exist, analyze the relevance of not having all neces-
sary information, and evaluate the reasonably foreseeable significant
adverse impacts based upon accepted scientific methods.15
g. Decision on the Project
To ensure that the EA process and citizen participation are meaning-
ful, the EA should be an integral factor in the Board of Directors' final
decision as to whether or not to approve funding for a particular pro-
ject. The final decision should incorporate several important conditions.
First, the final decision should be in writing and discuss the results of
the EA, explain why the project was chosen above all other alterna-
tives, and provide reasons for making other choices, such as require-
153. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (1990); ECE Transboundary EIA Convention, supra
note 143, at App. 11(b).
154. Similar provisions exist under NEPA and the ECE Transboundary EIA Con-
vention. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 (1990); ECE Transboundary EIA Convention, supra note
143, at App. II.
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ments for mitigating unavoidable adverse environmental effects.'5 5 Sec-
ond, the final decision should explain how the project will further the
Bank's goals of environmentally sound and sustainable development,
democracy, and market economies. 156 Third, a threshold ceiling for sig-
nificant environmental impact should be set above which the Board is
not entitled to approve a project, in the same way that it would not
approve a project that was not economically viable. And fourth, mitiga-
tion measures, if any, should be incorporated into the loan covenants
along with procedures for monitoring and enforcement.
h. Limitations on Actions
No action concerning the loan proposal should be taken which would
adversely affect the environment or limit the choice of reasonable alter-
natives until the EBRD issues its final decision after reviewing the
EA .157
i. Access to Environmental Information1
58
The Bank will require the public availability of the environmental
assessment developed in conjunction with a project.'59 It refuses, how-
ever, to require that information be made available, prior to disclosure
of the EA, stating only that an operative right to access to such infor-
mation should be determined as a matter of national law in the country
of operation. 60
Reliance on national law to effectuate access to information is insuf-
ficient and the Bank should not rely on the implementation of national
laws to achieve policies which the Bank itself should be comnitted to
155. The ECE Transboundary EIA Convention requires that the final decision take
"due account" of the EA. ECE Transboundary EIA Convention, supra note 143, at
art. 6; The EC Directive states that the EA "must be taken under consideration in the
development process." EC Directive, supra note 146, at art. 8. The United States re-
quires the decision to be explained in a Record of Decision. 40 C.F.R. § 1505.2 (1990).
The agency involved must state its reasons for selecting the alternative chosen and
identify those alternatives which are environmentally preferable. Id.
156. WORKSHOP STATEMENT, supra note 54, at para. 10a.
157. Under the provisions of NEPA, United States government agencies are pro-
hibited from undertaking any action concerning a project which would (1) have an
adverse environmental impact, or (2) limit the choices of reasonable actions. 40 C.F.R.
§ 1506.1 (1990).
158. See WOLD & ZAELKE, ACCESS TO INFORMATION AND THE EUROPEAN BANK
FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT (draft 1991) (offering more a complete dis-
cussion of the merits and needs of access to information) (on file with The American
University Journal of International Law & Policy).
159. FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, supra note 46, at para. 25.
160. Response to Comments, supra note 55, at 6.
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carrying out. While these projects may occur in the countries of opera-
tions and their laws should be binding on these activities, these activi-
ties are EBRD actions. It is the EBRD, through its loans, which is
responsible for these projects and the Bank must bear the responsibility
ensuring that the public is made aware of what these projects entail.
The Bank, rather than the country of operation, has the burden in its
Articles of Agreement to promote democratic principles, including pub-
lic access to information. 16 The Bank has the ability, without political
ramifications, simply to require as a condition to the loan that such
information be made available to the public, just as they can require
any other condition, such as the payment of interest.
The Bank should address its failure to require public access to infor-
mation by amending its Environmental Policy to require that no action
be taken unless the public is afforded full access to the information
developed as soon as the information is received by the Bank.' 2 The
proper policy course for the Bank to adopt begins with the rebuttable
presumption that all information contained in, or forming the basis of,
the environmental assessment is part of the public domain.6 3 Only in
cases where the dissemination of such information presents a threat to
the security of the country of operation or a nation state participating
in the loan project, or in very limited cases where the dissemination of
the information would compromise a trade secret, should this presump-
tion be overruled.
In addition, the Bank should condition the approval of any loan ac-
tion upon the full access of the public to the information developed.
Such an across-the-board procedural loan requirement is the best way
to implement the policy.
If the Bank continues to resist its responsibility to provide the public
with information, then affected citizens and NGOs should be prepared
to constantly encourage the Bank to give real meaning to the term "ex-
pect" as used in its policies. Active participation by NGOs and citizens
can be used to deter the Bank from granting loans which do not pro-
vide for public access to environmental information in the terms of the
loan contract. Public pressure can also be brought to bear on loan pro-
ponents themselves to aid them in their decision to release their envi-
161. Article of Agreement, supra note 1, at preamble.
162. The Bank should use the information access procedures of NEPA as a model.
See, NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (1988) (describing the informational requirements of
NEPA).
163. Presently the Bank states only that it "will ensure that project sponsors will
provide adequate information on the environmental impacts of projects to goverments
and citizens" FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, supra note 46, at para. 23.
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ronmental information to the public. Further, United States law pro-
hibits the U.S. director of the Bank to vote in favor of any loan
proposal for which an environmental assessment has not been presented
to the Director and made public to affected groups and NGOs at least
120 days prior to the vote on the project."6 4 NGOs may have to use this
dissemination mechanism to ensure that local and regional groups and
NGOs have access to project EAs. Finally, if the Bank truly intends to
pass its responsibilities on to the national legislatures of the countries of
operations, then NGOs and citizens should be prepared to persuade
these bodies to pass such laws.
j. Environmental Veto
Bank policy provides that environmental concerns are weighed in
loan decisions on an equal basis with other factors in the funding deci-
sion. Under the existing loan policy scheme, a loan can still be ap-
proved, even if the project will cause widespread environmental degra-
dation, if countervailing factors such as profitability outweigh these
environmental factors; the Environmental Policy states that a project
"can be rejected on environmenal grounds when there are major envi-
ronmental problem's"' 65 but does not require that the project be re-
jected in such circumstances. This policy fails to accord environmental
factors the deference necessary to protect the region's already fragile
environment'6 6 and to meet the Bank's goals of sustainable
development.
The best method for ensuring environmental deference is to imple-
ment a mandatory environmental veto in the project funding determi-
nation. Using such a veto, if the projected net environmental outcome
of a proposed project results in a loss of environmental quality then the
project should not be funded. This is not to imply that absolutely no
development can occur, but rather, a project resulting in an environ-
mental loss should be redesigned to incorporate mitigation measures
and offsetting environmental benefits sufficient to transform the envi-
ronmental net loss into a net gain before the project is funded. Alterna-
tively, the Bank could fund a "compensating" project somewhere else
164. 22 U.S.C. § 262m-7(a)-(f) (1988). At the time of this writing, the United
States Executive Director was forced to abstain or vote no on every project because the
Bank had failed to meet the requirements of this law, popularly known as the "Pelosi
Amendment."
165. FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, supra note 46, at para. 16.




that will provide the necessary offsetting environmental benefits. 1 67 At
the very least, all cost-benefit analyses conducted to determine the prof-
itability of any potential project should reflect the environmental and
social costs to the extent possible.' 68
Absent a mandatory environmental veto in the Bank's policies,
NGOs and citizens groups may have no other recourse beyond dili-
gence and hard work. Without an environmental veto it will be neces-
sary to closely monitor all the Bank's projects and to bring pressure to
bear upon the Bank, member states, the country of operation and the
loan proponent when the Bank seeks to fund a project with a net envi-
ronmental loss.
k. Public Participation
The importance of public participation in the decision-making pro-
cess as a means to protect the environment cannot be overstated. The
Brundtland Commission reported that sustainable development cannot
be achieved without citizens' participation. 69 The Economic Commis-
sion of Europe considers public participation a fundamental right.
17 0
EBRD policy apparently recognizes the need for local public participa-
tion in the development of projects.' 7 ' The Bank states broadly that it
will "ensure that project sponsors provide adequate information to local
governments and local populations.' ' 2 If the Bank's goal is to ensure
real public participation, however, the Bank should do more.
While the provision of information to local citizens and NGOs is a
vital prelude to participation, by definition participation requires a
more active role for the affected individuals and groups. At the least,
this requires a structural process that empowers local citizens and
groups with the ability to comment to the decision-maker on the infor-
mation provided to them, to develop and present to the decision-maker
167. See supra notes 111-113 and accompanying text (discussing methods to obtain
sustainable development including environmental trade-offs at the project and program
level).
168. See supra notes 84-90 and accompanying text (discussing the economic value
of environmental protection and methods for evaluating it).
169. OUR COMMONI FUTURE, supra note 40, at 65.
170. ECE Draft Charter, supra note 104, at 21.
171. See FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, supra note 46, at para. 23 (providing
that "[l]ocal participation in the economic transformation process will be essential for
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their own alternative information, and to have their comments and in-
formation reviewed and meaningfully addressed in the decision.
173
In short, the Bank should adopt a procedural framework that embod-
ies a notification and commenting mechanism whereby interested par-
ties can play a role in the Bank's decisions. The following form the
integral components of such a system: notification, draft commenting
period, public hearing, final commenting period and response to com-
ments. The Bank or project proponent should notify citizens, involved
governments and NGOs of any lending activity before the EA process
begins, or if a project will not require an EA, a reasoned decision as to
why an EA is not required. 17" As it stands, the Environmental Policy
only requires notification to citizens of Category A projects - those
which potentially may have significant environmental impacts - and cit-
izens are not entitled to the reasons for categorizing a project. 17 The
Bank or project sponsor should invite comments from affected citizens,
governments and NGOs to identify the significant issues involved in the
proposed action and any reasonable alternatives. In addition, the Bank
should circulate a draft of the environmental assessment for comment
by citizens, governments, and NGOs.176 Under certain circumstances,
including when a project generates public controversy, the Bank should
provide a public hearing,17 7 as well as at least a two-month period to
submit written comments prior to completion of the final EA and final
decision. The Bank or project proponent should respond meaningfully
to comments and fully integrate comments and their responses into the
final environmental assessment. 78 In addition, the final EA should ex-
173. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1503.1-1503.4 (1990) (discussing the detailed commenting
requirements of NEPA).
174. See WORKSHOP STATEMENT, supra note 54, at paras. 12-13 (presenting the
workshop's recommended procedural framework for notification and commentary). See
also, NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4321-4370a (1988) and its implementing regulations at 40
C.F.R. § 1508.22 (1990) (mandating notification requirements for the Council on En-
vironmental Quality). Notice is given in what is termed a "notice of intent" which has
the force of law. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.22 (1990).
175. FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, supra note 46, at paras. 11-14.
176. WORKSHOP STATEMENT, supra note 54, at para. 13. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1503.1-
1503.4 (1990) (listing the notification and commenting requirements of the Council on
Environmental Quality).
177. WORKSHOP STATEMENT, supra note 54, at para. 14. The United States gov-
ernment requires such hearings for NEPA-related issues. See 40 C.F.R. § 1506.6(b)
(1991) (requiring agencies to provide notice of NEPA-related hearings and public
meetings in order to inform interested or affected parties). The agencies must also pro-
vide notice of the availability of environmental documents. Id.
178. WORKSHOP STATEMENT, supra note 54, at para. 14. See 40 C.F.R. § 1503.4
(1990) (requiring that the Council on Environmental Quality respond meaningfully to
and integrate the responses of the Bank or project proponent).
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plain why a particular alternative was chosen before it is submitted to
the Board for approval.
To provide more meaningful public participation, the Bank should
change its public participation policy. As a matter of practice, it must
also require as a loan condition that all development plans incorporate
public participation procedures. In both instances the procedures must
provide the public with a mechanism, such as the one outlined above, to
voice their concerns.
If the EBRD is not forthcoming with such measures to facilitate
public participation, citizens and NGOs will have to focus their efforts
on influencing Bank lending in alternative arenas. The most notable
venues for alternative public participation will include the written
press, radio, and television, and the governments of both the country of
operation and the shareholder countries.
1. Monitoring and Enforcement
The Bank's intent to monitor compliance after the project has begun
operations as well as establishing sanctions for violating loan conditions
is encouraging." 9 The Bank's provisions requiring an evaluation of a
projects real environmental impact judged against the anticipated im-
pacts predicted in the EA place the EBRD in the forefront of post
project analysis. 180
C. JUDICIAL AND QUASI-JUDICIAL REVIEW 81
EBRD policies lack an appeal process which would enable concerned
individuals and groups to challenge Bank decisions to fund a project. 82
The only way to cause the Bank to recant a decision to fund a project
is to petition the decision-makers who approved the loan or the direc-
tors of the Bank.
179. Response to Comments, supra note 55, at 7, paras. 15, 19.
180. Id, at para. 19.
181. See Wold & Zaelke, Establishing an Administrative Review Tribunal at the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Devlopment: A Model for Improving MBD
Decisionmaking, 2 DUKE ENVTL. L. & PoL'Y FORUM 59 (1992) (offering a more com-
plete discussion of the needs and merits of an independent administrative review tribu-
nal); CHRISTENSEN, GREEN APPEAL: A PROPOSAL FOR AN ENVIRONbMENTAL COM.Is-
SION OF ENQUIRY AT THE WORLD BANK (1990) (paper prepared for the Natural
Resources Defense Council) (discussing the need for an independent administrative re-
view tribunal) (on file with American University Journal of International Law &
Policy).
182. See Response to Comments, supra note 55, at 7 (asserting that the Bank be-
lieves that a judicial review mechanism is "inconsistent with the legal status of the
Bank and cannot be accepted").
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Both courses of action provide inadequate assurance that any ill-con-
ceived Bank decisions will be reversed. Appeals to the decision-maker
who approved the project should not be relied upon because they put
ill-placed faith in the ability of the decision-maker to review his own
decision rationally. Simply put, even a once objective decision-maker is
no longer wholly objective when his or her decision is called into
question.
Review by the Bank's directors is equally unpalatable. The Bank's
directors have a vested interest in supporting the staff of the Bank upon
whom they rely to carry on the Bank's day-to-day operations. Further-
more, Bank directors, much like the directors of other large scale cor-
porations, are generally not involved in the Bank's daily operations.
Much of their information is filtered to them by the very staff which
made the decision on an ill-conceived loan. Finally, the time demands
placed on the Bank's directors will render them unable to review chal-
lenges to specific loans with anything more than a cursory examination.
Such an examination is insufficient given the complexity of the environ-
mental concerns raised by Bank loan projects.
To protect against environmentally unsound Bank loans, EBRD must
submit its decisions to some form of independent review. Affected citi-
zens and NGOs should be able to petition an independent body to re-
view the EBRD's decision to fund a project.
The importance of independent review for environmental protection
is recognized throughout the world, including Central and Eastern Eu-
rope. For example, a workshop comprised of leading public interest
lawyers from the region recently concluded that an effective enforce-
ment mechanism for citizens is an essential element of their democratic
right to protect their environment.' 83 A report by the Czechoslovak
Federal Committee on the Environment stated that independent ad-
ministrative courts are necessary to help Czechoslovakia institute dem-
ocratic reforms and repair the country's environmental damage.184 The
World Commission on Environment and Development considers access
to independent judiciaries essential to attain sustainable
development. 185
In addition, EIA laws frequently provide for independent review of
agency actions. For example, the ECE Draft Transboundary EIA Con-
183. See WORKSHOP STATEMENT, supra note 54, at para. 22 (stating that "the
democratic rights of citizens in Central and Eastern Europe to protect their environ-
ment, have access to information, and participate in the decision-making process be-
comes meaningless without the corollary right to enforce these rights").
184. VAVROUSEK, supra note 5, at 104.
185. EXPERTS GROUP, supra note 105, at 63, 119-20.
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vention guarantees access to administrative and judicial courts. 88 The
most important reason for NEPA's success, meanwhile, has been the
acceptance by United States courts of a citizen's right to bring legal
actions to enforce the requirements of the statute. Such citizen suits
quickly established a strict judicial review standard for procedural vio-
lations of NEPA. Significantly, the remedy for a violation is an injunc-
tion to maintain the status quo until the violation is corrected. Courts
consider procedural violations of NEPA so serious that injunctions are
almost always granted.18 7 Some believe that in spite of NEPA's ex-
haustive procedures, its success in improving agency decisions is largely
attributable to citizen enforcement.1
8 8
An independent review board ensures that citizens can enforce their
democratic rights to participate and have access to information. More-
over, an independent review board, unrestrained by the political aims of
those in power and willing to defend individual rights against abuse, is
critical to democracy: one cannot justify granting authority to a group
of officials without some mechanism which assures that they remain
accountable to those they serve.
In order to provide for such a review process the EBRD should either
create an independent quasi-judicial tribunal or it should submit itself
to the jurisdiction of a pre-existing recognized international tribunal. In
either case the EBRD should not retain any immunity from the tribu-
nal's jurisdiction, thereby ensuring that no Bank loan decision can re-
main insulated from this necessary check on the Bank's currently un-
fettered discretion.1
8 9
186. ECE Draft Transboundary EIA Convention, supra note 143, at art. 3.
187. See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531 (1987) (holding
that although a presumption of a violation of the Alaska National Interest Lands Con-
servation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 3120(a)(3)(C) (1988), which is similar to NEPA, was con-
trary to traditional equitable principles, "the balance of harms will usually favor issu-
ance of an injunction to protect the environment").
Since the Supreme Court decided Village of Gambell, two courts have abandoned
presumptions in favor of injunctions. See Save the Yaak Committee v. Block, 840 F.2d
714, 722 (9th Cir. 1988) (issuing an injunction after balancing competing interests
rather than presuming an injunction); Town of Huntington v. Marsh, 884 F.2d 648,
653 (2d Cir. 1989) (refusing to apply a presumption in favor of injunctive relief follow-
ing a violation of NEPA); but see Sierra Club v. Marsh, 872 F.2d 497, 502-04 (1st
Cir. 1989) (holding that the failure to adequately consider environmental effects pro-
duces irreparable harm to NEPA's goal of producing informed decisions).
188. Blumm & Brown, Pluralism and the Environment. The Role of Commenting
Agencies in NEPA Litigation, 14 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 277, 280 (1990).
189. See WORKSHOP STATEMENT, supra note 54, at paras. 22-29 (recommending
that the Bank create an independent review board). Regardless of whether the EBRD
chooses to rectify this situation by creating an independent review board or by conced-
ing jurisdiction, a number of provisions are necessary to create effective review. These
provisions include:
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Two aspects of the Bank's decisions should be subject to review.
First, whether the environmental assessment, as a matter of procedure,
meets all the requirements of the environmental assessment process.
Second, as a matter of substance, whether the decision is well founded,
based upon the information contained in the environmental assessment,
and consistent with the Bank's mandates.
The Bank should also vest the tribunal with the power to review
ongoing projects to ensure that they do not violate the parameters es-
tablished in the original environmental assessment or in the loan condi-
tions. This program of ongoing independent review in conjunction with
the Bank's proposed system of monitoring and enforcement is necessary
to preclude the proverbial "runaway train" projects; projects that, once
begun, take on a life of their own, acquire momentum, and make it
difficult, if not impossible, for internal mechanisms to bring them to a
halt.190
The tribunal should be empowered with a wide range of remedies
and sanctions which it can bring to bear on both the loan proponent
and the Bank itself. Such remedies necessarily include: the power to
grant injunctions to halt degenerative projects, the power to grant mon-
etary damages, the power to order the reparation of harms already in-
curred and to prevent harms which are poised to occur, the power to
allocate fees and costs to the challenging party so that the economically
disadvantaged are not precluded from seeking review,1" 1 and the power
to alter the terms of the loan agreement so that they comply with the
mandates of the EBRD.
Absent a system of independent review, there will be no clear way
for the public to protect their rights. Parties seeking review of EBRD
decisions will have to find a "hook" in the project that allows them to
-the right of citizens, NGOs, governments and their agencies to challenge final
actions of the Bank, including the adequacy of the EA and public participation
process, and all other procedural and substantive obligations of the Bank.
- the right of citizens to use class action suits to protect fragmented and diffuse
populations.
* the right to oral proceedings and discovery of all information relevant to the
case.
I written explanations of decisions at the request of the petitioner.
Id.
190. See WORLDWIDE NEWS, Nov.-Dec. 1989, at I (describing continuation of the
World Bank funded Sardor Sarovar Dam in India's Narmada Valley despite intense
local opposition to this project which will cause widespread environmental degradation
and resettlement of hundreds of thouands of people) (on file with American University
Journal of International Law & Policy); Bank Information Center, supra note 133, at
25-27 (also describing the World Bank funded Sardor Sarovar Dam).




obtain review of the project by other means. In this regard individuals
and NGOs will have to review projects against the laws of the country
of operation, other countries participating in the projects and of the
shareholder nations, to determine whether the Bank's proposed or ac-
tual actions subject it to review by the judiciaries of these countries.
D. LIABILITY
Regardless of the number of safeguards imposed on Bank actions to
prevent environmental harms, it is impossible to guarantee that the ac-
tions of the Bank will leave a land as pristine, or in most cases in the
region, no worse off, then it was before the Bank acted. The dilemma
that arises is how to ensure that, when a Bank action causes environ-
mental harm, resources are available to rectify the harm caused. Most
simply put, those who cause the harm should be required to provide the
resources and monies to correct the harm. Two parties may be liable
for harm caused by Bank action: the Bank and the loan proponent.
1. Lender Liability
The principle of lender liability has its genesis in the enforcement of
the United States Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion, and Liability Act ("CERCLA").1' 2 While lender liability has
evolved inconsistently, it generally applies when a lender participates in
the day-to-day operations of a borrower, beyond the extent necessary to
protect the lender's interest. By virtue of this participation, the lender
can be held liable for all harm caused by the borrower's operations,
even where the harm did not result directly from the lender's actions.
93
192. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified in relevant part at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9675 (1988)), amended by Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
193. See United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1558 (lth Cir.
1990) (holding that the lender's CERCLA liability depends on whether its involvement
was of a "degree indicating a capacity to influence the corporation's [behavior]"). Sub-
sequent to the Fleet Factors decision, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit clari-
fied that "there must be some actual management of the facility before a secured credi-
tor will [be subject to liability]." In re Bergsoe Metal Corp., 910 F.2d 668, 672 (9th
Cir. 1990).
The formulation of the Fleet Factors capacity test has been the subject of great
criticism for the broad sweep of liability it creates without the lender ever having acted
in regard to a harm caused. See Note, Limiting the Liability of the Passive Lender
Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
of 1980, 26 TULSA L.J. 75, 97 (1990) (proposing a CERCLA amendment which would
allow "a lender to provide managerial assistance without risking exorbitant liability
unless the assistance rises to the level of day to day participation or directly causes the
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In keeping with contemporary practice, the EBRD should recognize
that as a lender it will at certain times have the capacity to effect
changes in the operations of its loan recipients. With this power comes
the responsibility to use it conscientiously. In its policies or, alterna-
tively, as a condition in its loan documents, the Bank should recognize
the principle of lender liability and its responsibility to act both proac-
tively, to head off any harm that it has the power to prevent, and reme-
dially, when a harm nonetheless occurs. Two purposes are served by
this recognition. First, it will cause the Bank to act with greater care to
avoid liability. Second, it will ensure that the already strained econo-
mies of the region will not have to carry the added costs of the Bank's
environmental mishaps.
2. Proponent and Personal Liability
At the heart of much of the successful recovery from environmental
degradation in the United States has been one common principle: "the
polluter pays."' 94 Despite its simplicity, this principle is one of the most
valuable tools for rectifying environmental harm. The principle merely
requires that the individual or entity which caused the harm, and which
[harm]"). In fact, the outcry from lending institutions has resulted in an unsuccessful
attempt to legislate a blanket liability exemption for lenders. See H.R. 2085, 101st
Cong., Ist Sess. (1989) (proposing to exempt all lenders from CERCLA liability).
In response to this outcry from lenders, the Environmental Protection Agency, the
agency of the United States government assigned to administer CERCLA, is currently
reformulating its policy on lender liability. See EPA Draft Lays Out Lender Liability
for Site Cleanup, 59 U.S.L.W. 2225 (U.S. Oct. 16, 1990) (discussing the EPA's propo-
sal to limit CERCLA liability). The EPA's proposed new rule details the extent to
which a lender or other entity holding indicia of ownership can take action to protect
their security interest without participating in the management of a facility sufficient to
incur liability under CERCLA. 56 Fed. Reg. 28798, 28,806-07 (1991). This proposed
rule, however, deals more with the rights of those who have come into possession of a
facility for the sole purpose of protecting a security interest. The application of such a
safe harbor to the EBRD must be questioned because, unlike the traditional lending
institutions which a safe harbor is intended to protect, the EBRD is required to pro-
mote environmentally sound and sustainable development in each of its actions. There-
fore, the mere inaction of the EBRD, creating the opportunity for environmental de-
mise, would be in violation of this mandate and should be sufficient to give rise to
liability.
Despite the self-interested protestations of the lending community and their ability to
influence change on their behalf, the formulation of liability established in the Fleet
Factors decision is the correct formulation. Only the "capacity to control" standard
recognizes that those with the ability to prevent environmental degradation have a duty
to do so.
194. See United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d
726, 742-45 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988), could be applied to impose liability on off-site
generators and transporters of hazardous waste without fault or negligence).
[VOL. 7:559
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
profited from the harm, be responsible for the cost of the harm. In
application, the "polluter pays" principle extends not only to the re-
sponsible umbrella entity, usually a corporation or company, but also to
the individuals within the company whose decisions created the
harm.'95 This two pronged system of liability is a powerful deterrent to
irresponsible environmental behavior. Individuals whose decisions cause
widespread environmental damage are not sheltered from the costs of
the damage by the umbrella organization. Instead, they, in their indi-
vidual capacity and with their individual resources, are also
responsible.19
In order to prevent loan recipients from acting in an environmentally
irresponsible manner, the Bank should extend liability for environmen-
tal harm to both the umbrella entity and its controlling individuals.
The EBRD should require as a condition of each loan, either through
Bank policy or loan terms, that the borrower and its controlling officers
subject themselves explicitly to liability for the consequences of their
actions. If the Bank is unwilling to require its loan recipients to act in
accordance with common principles of responsibility, then action
should be taken by the NGO community and by concerned individuals
to bring about national legislation, applicable to the Bank's actions,
which incorporates these principles of liability. In the absence of such
legislation these nations will find that the general populace will con-
stantly be called upon to answer for the environmental debts of the few.
CONCLUSION
While the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development has
in many ways not lived up to the expectations that coincided with its
creation, it would be short-sighted to dismiss the Bank as a failure.
Despite the fact that the Bank's environmental policies have so far
given little more than lip service to its mandates to promote sustainable
development and democratic principles, these mandates still exist in the
Articles of Agreement by which the Bank's operations are bound.
The challenge which lies ahead is to bring these mandates to bear in
changing the Bank's environmental policies and affecting the lending
decisions that the Bank makes. While the Bank's environmental poli-
cies do not provide adequate procedures to give citizens and NGOs es-
tablished mechanisms for informed participation and review of Bank
lending, these procedures do, nonetheless, provide certain opportunities
195. See id. at 742 (extending CERCLA liability to the owners and operators of
corporations as well as the corporation itself).
196. See id. at 743-45 (discussing individual liability under CERCLA).
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that concerned citizens and NGOs can build upon to achieve their
goals.
The limitations the Bank has placed upon citizens and NGOs seek-
ing to affect Bank operations dictate that citizens and NGOs will sim-
ply have to try harder. They will have to become better organized,
more informed, more involved, and better supported. They will have to
work not only within the EBRD's procedures, but will have to apply
themselves to other available alternatives, such as public information
and national laws, which can be used to hold the Bank accountable.
